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LESSONS FROM THE NBA LOCKOUT: UNION 
DEMOCRACY, PUBLIC SUPPORT, AND THE FOLLY 
OF THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL PLAYERS 
ASSOCIATION 
MATTHEW J. PARLOW* 
Abstract 
By most accounts, the National Basketball Players Association 
(NBPA)—the union representing the players in the NBA—conceded a 
significant amount of money and other contractual terms in the new ten-
year collective bargaining agreement1 (2011 Agreement2) that ended the 
2011 NBA lockout.  Player concessions were predictable because the 
NBA’s economic structure desperately needed an overhaul.  The magnitude 
of such concessions, however, was startling.  The substantial changes in the 
division of basketball-related income, contract lengths and amounts, salary 
cap provisions, and revenue sharing rendered the NBA lockout—and the 
resulting 2011 Agreement—a near-complete victory for the owners.  
Several interpretations have been offered to explain the lopsided deal, 
                                                                                                                 
 * Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Marquette University 
Law School.  I would like to thank Professor Janine Kim for her comments on an earlier 
draft of this article; Brittany Earl, Aaron Hernandez, AJ Peterman, and Amy Rogan-Mehta, 
for their research assistance; and Marquette University Law School for its financial support. 
 1. The collective bargaining agreement is the “‘supreme governing authority’ 
concerning employment” in the employer-employee or ownership-labor relationship—
including in professional sports; it is the result of negotiations in the collective bargaining 
process as provided for by the National Labor Relations Act.  Michael A. Mahone, Jr., 
Sentencing Guidelines for the Court of Public Opinion: An Analysis of the National Football 
League’s Revised Personal Conduct Policy, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 181, 192 (2008). 
 2. See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n & Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, NBPA Collective 
Bargaining Agreement (Dec. 11, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2011 Agreement]. 
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including the financial strain on players during the lockout and the players’ 
emotional reactions to the negotiations.  These justifications are intriguing, 
particularly in light of the racial overtones that marked the entire process.  
These explanations have significant merit, but they fail to completely 
account for why the NBA players agreed to such drastically unfavorable 
terms.  This article provides a fuller analysis of how this surprising result 
came about.  In doing so, it takes an interdisciplinary approach using 
communications and industrial relations scholarship that highlight the 
critical importance of intra-union communications, public relations 
campaigns, and union democracy.  Through this analysis, this article not 
only assesses the missteps of the NBPA during the NBA lockout, but also 
provides guidance to professional sports unions for future collective 
bargaining negotiations during periods of labor unrest.  
I. Introduction 
When the National Basketball Association (NBA) team owners locked 
out the players in the summer of 2011,3 it did not come as a surprise to even 
the most casual of observers.  The economic structure of the league was 
badly outdated and in need of revision.4  Moreover, the Great Recession5 
accelerated the financial dysfunction of the NBA.6  Given this situation, it 
                                                                                                                 
 3. The term “lockout” in the context of labor and employment law refers to the 
“bargaining mechanism in which an employer refuses to allow its unionized employees to 
work—while at the same time withholding their salaries—in order to gain leverage over the 
union during labor negotiations.”  Nathaniel Grow, Decertifying Players Unions: Lessons 
from the NFL and NBA Lockouts of 2011, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 473, 474 n.3 (2013) 
(citing C. Quincy Ewell, Comment, The Key to Unlocking the Partial Lockout: A Discussion 
of the NLRB’s Decisions in Midwest Generation and Bunting Bearings, 112 PENN. ST. L. 
REV. 907, 913 (2008)). 
 4. See Howard Beck, Powerful Agent’s Blunt Warning About Future of the N.B.A., 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at D1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/23/sports/ 
basketball/23falk.html?_r=0 (citing NBA power agent David Falk describing how the 
NBA’s financial system was broken in 2009 and what that meant for the renegotiation of the 
collective bargaining agreement in 2011).  
 5. For the purposes of this article, the term “Great Recession” will refer to the 
significant economic downturn that affected the United States and global economies 
beginning in 2007.  See generally Catherine Rampell, ‘Great Recession’: A Brief Etymology, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/great-recession-
a-brief-etymology/.   
 6. See generally Matthew J. Parlow, The NBA and the Great Recession: Implications 
for the Upcoming Collective Bargaining Renegotiation, 6 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 195 (2010); Jim Souhan, NBA’s Dysfunctional Finances Might Mean a Long 
Lockout, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 30, 2011, http://www.startribune.com/ 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss1/1
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was clear that the negotiations over the 2011 Agreement would be 
contentious.   
The owners claimed that a majority of them were losing money each 
year.7  Accordingly, they demanded major concessions from the players for 
the 2011 Agreement.8  The National Basketball Player’s Association 
(NBPA) contested this claim, arguing that owners suffered merely 
“accounting losses rather than cash going out the door.”9  From the NBPA’s 
perspective, then, only modest updates to the terms of the existing 
collective bargaining agreement (2005 Agreement10) were needed.11  The 
ensuing negotiations focused on the division of the league’s revenue 
between the owners and players, contract lengths and amounts, salary cap 
provisions, and revenue sharing among the teams.12  Ultimately, the parties 
were unable to come to terms, and the NBA team owners locked out the 
players on June 30.13  
The lockout ended after 161 days, when the two sides finally settled on 
the new ten-year 2011 Agreement.14  By nearly all accounts, the players 
fared poorly in this deal.  Compared to the 2005 Agreement, the players 
made dramatic concessions on each of the aforementioned negotiating 
terms.15  This result was startling for a variety of reasons.  After all, players’ 
unions were some of the only private-sector unions to increase their 
                                                                                                                 
sports/wolves/124826679.html (describing the financial problems with the 2005 
Agreement).  
 7. See Lance Taubin, Note, Welcome to the Real 2011 NBA Lockout: Where Owner-
Friendly Tax Provisions and Non-Monetized Benefits Color the Lockout Landscape, 11 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 139, 140-41 (2012). 
 8. See John R. Sigety, The Cost of Fair Play: An Examination of How Salary Cap 
Proposals Have Affected Past Collective Bargaining Agreements and Will Affect the Coming 
NBA Collective Bargaining Negotiations, WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J., Fall 2011, at 23, 45. 
 9. Milad Sedeh, The N.B.P.A. Disclaimer: The End of the Bargaining Relationship or 
a Sham?, WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J., Spring 2013, at 56, 57.  For a discussion of the 
difference between an accounting loss and a cash loss, see José Gabilondo, Financial Moral 
Panic! Sarbanes-Oxley, Financier Folk Devils, and Off-Balance-Sheet Arrangements, 36 
SETON HALL L. REV. 781, 823-25 (2006). 
 10.  Nat’l Basketball Ass’n & Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, NBPA Collective 
Bargaining Agreement (July 29, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 Agreement], available at http:// 
www.nbpa.com/cba/2005.  
 11. Andrew Brandt, What Owners, Players Want in New CBA, ESPN (June 29, 2011), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?page=labor-110629. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. NBA Lockout Timeline, NBA, http://www.nba.com/2011/news/09/09/labor-timeline/ 
(last updated Dec. 9, 2011). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See infra Part II.  
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bargaining ability in an era of declining membership and influence for 
private-sector unions.16  Moreover, the National Football League (NFL) 
was in a similar situation that same summer, but a more player-friendly 
collective bargaining agreement emerged from its lockout.17  The NFL 
players’ relative success was especially puzzling considering that the NBA 
was generally viewed as the league where players held more power than the 
owners.18  So why did the NBA players wind up negotiating such a bad deal 
for themselves? 
Amid much speculation, two explanations for the debacle have become 
dominant.  One emphasizes the financial strain on players that led to greater 
willingness to drop their demands and end the lockout.19  The second 
suggests that emotions, rather than economics, propelled players to make 
financially irrational decisions during negotiations.20  In particular, the 
racial overtones of the negotiating dynamic appeared to influence players’ 
actions.21  Undoubtedly, both of these explanations help clarify the 
problems that plagued the players’ bargaining position.  But they fail to 
offer a full account of the breakdown that occurred on the players’ side, 
especially as it relates to the effectiveness of the players’ union that 
spearheaded the negotiations for the 2011 Agreement.   
This article explores the structural issues within the NBPA that 
undermined the negotiations and resulted in the players’ concession to 
essentially all of the owners’ demands.  Recent scholarship in the fields of 
                                                                                                                 
 16. See César F. Rosado Marzán, Book Note, Success Through Political Action: 
Collective Bargaining in the Private Sector, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 655, 660 (2003) 
(reviewing SUCCESS THROUGH POLITICAL ACTION: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR (Paul F. Clark et al. eds., 2003)).  For example, the average baseball player salary in 
2003 was $2.37 million compared with $3.21 million in 2012, with minimum salaries 
increasing from $300,000 to $480,000 over that same time period—a staggering 60% jump.  
Average Salary Hits Record $3.2 Million, ESPN.COM (Dec. 7, 2012), http://espn.go.com/ 
mlb/story/_/id/8724285/mlb-average-salary-38-percent-32-million.  For more information on 
the decline of private-sector union membership, see News Release, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members 2013, at 1 (Jan. 24, 2014), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf (identifying the union membership rate—
that is, the percentage of wage and salary workers who were members of unions—as 11.3% 
in 2012, down from 20.1% in 1983). 
 17. See Patrick Rishe, Who Won the 2011 NFL Lockout?, FORBES (July 21, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/07/21/who-won-the-2011-nfl-lockout/.  
 18. See Kevin Carpenter, NFL and NBA Lockouts: A U.K. Lawyer’s Legal 
Retrospective, 20 SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 5-6 (2013).   
 19. See infra Part III.A.  
 20. See infra Part III.C. 
 21. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss1/1
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industrial relations and communications, in addition to labor law, provides a 
robust framework for analyzing the shortcomings of the NBPA that led to 
the 2011 Agreement.22  Specifically, understanding the importance of union 
democracy, public relations campaigns, and intra-union communications, to 
successful collective bargaining reveals both where the NBPA went wrong 
and how other professional players’ unions can negotiate with greater 
success in the future.  
To begin this analysis, Part II details some of the major terms of the 
2011 Agreement and compares them to the terms of the 2005 Agreement.  
This Part highlights the nature and extent of the losses that the players 
incurred as a result of poor collective bargaining.  Part III analyzes the two 
dominant explanations for the 2011 Agreement, fleshing out the financial 
and emotional concerns that helped drive many of the players’ missteps in 
the collective bargaining process.  While these explanations have merit, 
they tend to emphasize individual players’ motivations over the decisions 
and actions of the union.23  Given that the players’ union was leading the 
negotiations for most of the process, such explanations can only partially 
account for the outcome. 
Therefore, Part IV offers alternative, complementary theories for why the 
players largely failed in their collective bargaining negotiations.  This Part 
takes an interdisciplinary approach by looking to communications and 
industrial relations scholarship that have yet to be fully mined in the legal 
literature on labor disputes and collective bargaining.  This scholarship 
reveals how the NBPA’s deficiencies in union democracy, intra-union 
communications, and public relations undermined its bargaining position 
and doomed its efforts at the negotiating table.   
The goal of this article is to provide a new and useful framework for 
analyzing the collective bargaining process, particularly for players’ unions, 
but for other private-sector unions as well.  In that sense, it simultaneously 
offers guidance for future negotiations by players’ unions and other private-
sector unions.  Therefore, Part V offers concluding remarks regarding the 
implications of this framework. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 22. See infra Part IV.  
 23. An exception to the individualized focus of these explanations is the racial dynamics 
between team owners, who are overwhelmingly white, and the players, who are 
predominantly African American.  This, as I discuss in Part III below, involves a power 
struggle that also has a much longer history beyond this particular instance of labor unrest.   
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II. The 2011 Agreement 
Even before the lockout, the NBA owners claimed that the terms of the 
2005 Agreement needed major changes due to the financial losses they 
were sustaining each year.24  Specifically, the owners asserted that twenty-
two of the NBA’s thirty teams collectively lost more than $300 million in 
each of the previous three seasons.25  To address their claimed losses, the 
owners wanted four significant concessions from the players under the 2011 
Agreement: (1) a greater share of basketball-related income (BRI),26 (2) an 
adjustment in player contract length and amount, (3) more limited 
exceptions to the salary cap, and (4) changes in revenue sharing.27  The 
players eventually crumbled on all four fronts.  These concessions 
constituted the main changes in the 2011 Agreement compared to the 2005 
Agreement.28   
In terms of the BRI, the owners wanted to change the existing 
allocations, which were 57% for the players and 43% to the owners under 
the 2005 Agreement.29  Citing their annual losses, the owners demanded 
that the percentages be reversed in their favor, or at least split evenly.30  The 
NBPA sought to maintain the existing BRI allocations.31  Ultimately, in 
what was perhaps the most significant change to the 2011 Agreement, the 
BRI division went from 57-43 in favor of the players to essentially a 50-50 
split.32  The players thus relinquished approximately 12% of their collective 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Gabriel Feldman, Brady v. NFL and Anthony v. NBA: The Shifting Dynamics in 
Labor-Management Relations in Professional Sports, 86 TUL. L. REV. 831, 844-45 (2012). 
 25. Id. at 845. 
 26. BRI is the aggregate operating revenue of the NBA or its member teams during a 
particular season—for example, money from television contracts, ticket sales, merchandise, 
and the like.  See 2005 Agreement, supra note 10, art. VII, § 1(a).  
 27. Grow, supra note 3, at 494.  
 28. Compare 2011 Agreement, supra note 2, with 2005 Agreement, supra note 10; see 
also NBA Lockout Timeline, supra note 13. 
 29. Kemper C. Powell, Note, Beyond Brady and Anthony: The Contemporary Role of 
Antitrust Law in the Collective Bargaining Process, 14 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 147, 
161 (2013). 
 30. Grow, supra note 3, at 494 n.140 (noting that the owners were interested in a BRI 
split of 57% for the owners and 43% for the players).   
 31. Taubin, supra note 7, at 146. 
 32. See Larry Coon, Breaking Down Changes in New CBA, ESPN (Nov. 28, 2011), 
http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/page/CBA-111128/how-new-nba-deal-compares-last-one.  
The players’ share of BRI may fluctuate a bit from between 49% and 51% depending on 
whether the BRI for a given year exceeds or falls short of expectations.  Id.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss1/1
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salaries in the 2011 Agreement.33  In terms of overall dollars, this change 
amounted to an annual revenue shift of somewhere between $225 and $300 
million from the players to the owners.34  As these figures demonstrate, the 
players conceded a substantial amount of money to the owners in the 2011 
Agreement. 
The NBA owners also demanded dramatic changes to the lengths and 
amounts of player contracts.  The owners ideally sought nonguaranteed 
player contracts, renewable on an annual basis.35  More realistically, they 
wanted to reduce the maximum length of player contracts, the maximum 
salaries that players could earn, and the amount of annual raises permitted 
in player contracts.36  The NBPA wanted minimal, if any, changes to the 
existing permissible contract terms, which were quite favorable to players.37  
The owners prevailed on this point, as the 2011 Agreement notably reduced 
the length and amount of new contracts and contract extensions for players.  
For those teams signing free agents that were eligible for the “Larry Bird 
exception” to the salary cap,38 the 2005 Agreement had permitted teams to 
sign these players to six-year contracts with 10% raises each year.39  Under 
the 2011 Agreement, however, teams can only sign their Larry Bird free 
agents to five-year contracts with 7.5% annual raises.40  For contract 
extensions, the 2005 Agreement allowed teams to sign their players to 
contract extensions for up to five years.41  The 2011 Agreement, on the 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Alexander C. Krueger-Wyman, Note, Collective Bargaining and the Best Interests 
of Basketball, 12 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 171, 188 (2012). 
 34. See Taubin, supra note 7, at 146. 
 35. Grow, supra note 3, at 494. 
 36. Sedeh, supra note 9, at 58; see also Grow, supra note 3, at 494. 
 37. Cf. Carpenter, supra note 18, at 5 (stating that NBA players were much better off 
under the 2005 CBA than were NFL players under their most recent CBA). 
 38. As a general matter, the Larry Bird exception allows teams to exceed the salary cap 
to sign their own free agents.  Michael A. McCann, It’s Not About the Money: The Role of 
Preferences, Cognitive Biases, and Heuristics Among Professional Athletes, 71 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1459, 1488 n.157 (2006) (explaining the origins of the Larry Bird exception); see also 
Larry Coon, Larry Coon’s NBA Salary Cap FAQ, CBAFAQ.COM (Jan. 15, 2014), http:// 
www.cbafaq.com/salarycap.htm#Q32 (detailing the various provisions related to the Larry 
Bird exception in the 2011 Agreement). 
 39. Coon, supra note 32.  The maximum salary amount could be no more than 25%, 
30%, or 35% of the salary cap, depending on the number of years of service that the player 
had at the time.  Id. 
 40. Id.  There are similar maximum salary limitations for these player contracts as with 
the 2005 Agreement.  See id. 
 41. Id.  This provision applied to veteran players or those players finishing their rookie 
contracts.  See id. 
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other hand, limits teams to four-year contract extensions for their players.42  
As these provisions demonstrate, the players gave up some financial 
security and earning power by agreeing to shorter contracts and smaller 
annual raises in the 2011 Agreement.  These were not insignificant 
concessions, especially given that the average NBA player’s career lasts 
only four and a half years.43 
On a related matter, the owners sought to limit their payroll costs by 
tightening up the “soft” salary cap from the 2005 Agreement, which 
provided for a number of generous exceptions that permitted teams to 
exceed the maximum salary cap.44  The owners publicly yearned for a 
“hard” salary cap, where a team’s total player salary could not exceed the 
salary cap for any reason.45  But in reality, the owners wanted more limited 
exceptions to the soft salary cap in the 2011 Agreement.46  Given that a 
hard salary cap would reduce player salaries, the NBPA naturally opposed a 
hard salary cap.  Instead, the union wanted to maintain the existing “soft” 
salary cap, with only minor modifications.47   
Ultimately, the 2011 Agreement preserved the soft salary cap, but it 
contained several provisions that limited—either de facto or de jure—a 
team’s ability to spend aggressively in excess of that cap.  The 2011 
Agreement’s treatment of the mid-level exception provides a good example.  
The mid-level exception allows a team with a player payroll in excess of 
the salary cap to sign a player for an amount equal to the average NBA 
player salary.48  The 2005 Agreement permitted teams to offer mid-level 
exception contracts for up to five years, starting at $5.765 million in the 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Id.  There is one exception: a team can designate one player on its roster for a five-
year extension if that player is finishing his rookie contract.  Id. 
 43. Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports 
Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 768 (2010). 
 44. Chris Deubert et al., All Four Quarters: A Retrospective and Analysis of the 2011 
Collective Bargaining Process and Agreement in the National Football League, 19 UCLA 
ENT. L. REV. 1, 72 n.502 (2012). 
 45. Carpenter, supra note 18, at 5; see also Benjamin A. Tulis, Final-Offer “Baseball” 
Arbitration: Contexts, Mechanics & Applications, 20 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 85, 
94 n.33 (2010) (defining a hard salary cap). 
 46. See NBA Lockout Timeline, supra note 13 (noting that on October 1, 2011, the 
owners and players met to negotiate regarding the salary cap and that the owners wanted 
changes to the existing soft salary cap). 
 47. Brandt, supra note 11. 
 48. See James L. Perzik, Mysteries of the NBA “Salary Cap” and the “Escrow and 
Tax” System, in 1 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: ENTERTAINMENT, ARTS, AND SPORTS LAW 
149, 155 (2007), available at SM009 ALI-ABA 149 (Westlaw).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss1/1
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2010-11 season, with 8% raises each year.49  The 2011 Agreement, on the 
other hand, limits teams that are not paying the luxury tax50 in a given year 
to offering four-year, mid-level exception contracts, starting at $5 million 
for the 2012-13 season, with 4.5% raises each year.51  For those teams 
paying the luxury tax in a given season, the 2011 Agreement further limits 
those teams to three-year, mid-level exception contacts, starting at $3 
million for the 2012-13 season, with 3% raises.52  The 2011 Agreement thus 
reduced the length and amount of mid-level exception contracts; such 
contracts are one of the primary avenues for teams to exceed the salary cap 
to increase spending on player salaries. 
Unlike the other three key negotiation points, revenue sharing53 was less 
publicly contentious but still incredibly important to both sides.  Players 
saw revenue sharing as a key subject for collective bargaining, even though 
it had not been collectively bargained previously.54  They wanted to 
collectively bargain with the owners on revenue sharing because they saw it 
as an opportunity to force smaller-market NBA teams to spend more money 
on player salaries.55  Conversely, the NBA owners—while not unanimous 
in their views on the topic—saw revenue sharing as a way to avoid 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Coon, supra note 32. 
 50. The luxury tax is a penalty or tax imposed on teams whose aggregate player salaries 
for a season exceed a specified amount.  Richard A. Kaplan, Note, The NBA Luxury Tax 
Model: A Misguided Regulatory Regime, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1615, 1617 (2004).  The 
luxury tax seeks to dissuade teams from having extremely high payrolls and spending 
significantly more than their counterparts.  See Robert Holo & Jonathan Talansky, Taxing 
the Business of Sports, 9 FLA. TAX. REV. 161, 203 n.158 (2008).  The monies collected from 
the luxury tax are used as part of the league’s revenue sharing plan.  See Frank J. Marallo, 
Jr., Note, Permeating the Good Old Boys Club: Why Holding the Commissioner of Baseball 
to a Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty Is in the “Best Interests” of the Game, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. 
& COM. L. 475, 493 n.134 (2013).  
 51. Coon, supra note 32.  
 52. Id.  
 53. Revenue sharing is the process of sharing some league and team revenue to maintain 
competitive balance among teams.  John Lombardo, Inside NBA’s Revenue Sharing, SPORTS 
BUS. J. (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2012/01/23/ 
Leagues-and-Governing-Bodies/NBA-revenue.aspx. 
 54. See Michael J. Fensom, NBA Owners, Players Call For Expanded Revenue Sharing 
in New Collective Bargaining Agreement, NJ.COM (June 27, 2011), http://www.nj.com/ 
nets/index.ssf/2011/06/nba_owners_players_call_for_ex.html; Derek Thompson, The NBA 
Lockout: Here’s What You Need to Know, ATLANTIC (June 30, 2011), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/06/the-nba-lockout-heres-what-you-need-
to-know/241251/.   
 55. Thompson, supra note 54. 
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perpetual financial losses by certain teams and thus maintain or achieve 
competitive balance.56   
The 2011 Agreement brought about significant changes in the league’s 
revenue sharing among teams.  At first glance, these changes appear to be 
friendlier to the players.  Teams not paying the luxury tax (presumably 
smaller-market teams) will receive more money from those teams that are 
paying the luxury tax (presumably the bigger-market teams) and thus can 
spend more on player salaries.57  The new luxury tax system is estimated to 
nearly triple the amount of money that is shared or redistributed;58 indeed, 
once the new luxury tax system is implemented in this 2013-14 season, it is 
anticipated that there will be an additional $140 million in revenue sharing 
compared to previous seasons.59  In theory, if the smaller-market teams 
have more money to spend on player salaries through such a robust 
revenue-sharing system, then the players on those teams should receive 
better salaries. 
However, certain components of the new luxury tax system suggest that 
the terms are not as favorable to players as they may appear.60  Specifically, 
the increase in luxury tax—aimed at redistributing league revenue by taxing 
teams with higher payrolls—may wind up creating significant financial 
disincentives for teams that choose not to exceed the luxury tax threshold.61  
If enough teams seek to avoid paying the new luxury tax, there will be less 
money to distribute through revenue sharing than was originally estimated.   
The comparison in luxury taxes between the 2005 Agreement and the 
2011 Agreement is instructive.  Under the 2005 Agreement, teams whose 
payroll exceeded the luxury tax threshold—an amount equivalent to 61% of 
                                                                                                                 
 56. See Henry Abbott, Sticking Point: Competitive Balance, ESPN.COM (Sept. 30, 
2011), http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/id/32164/sticking-point-competitive-balance.  
 57. See Coon, supra note 32.   
 58. Taubin, supra note 7, at 147. 
 59. See Lombardo, supra note 53. 
 60. For example, teams paying the luxury tax are more limited in their ability to offer 
mid-level exception contracts, in terms of length (three years versus four), starting salary ($3 
million instead of $5 million), and per-year salary increases (3% versus 4.5%).  See Coon, 
supra note 32.  Moreover, luxury taxpaying teams cannot acquire as much salary through a 
trade as non-taxpaying teams, do not have the biannual exception contract to offer free 
agents (as non-taxpaying teams do), and cannot receive a player through a sign-and-trade 
agreement.  Id.   
 61. See Brett Pollakoff, Stricter Luxury Tax Penalties in New CBA Could Actually Help 
Big Market Teams, NBCSPORTS (Aug. 18, 2013), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/ 
2013/08/18/stricter-luxury-tax-penalties-in-new-cba-could-actually-help-big-market-teams/ 
(explaining why few, if any teams, will wind up paying the luxury tax). 
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the BRI—were taxed at a dollar-for-dollar amount.62  For the first two years 
of the 2011 Agreement, this same dollar-for-dollar luxury tax remained.63  
After these first two seasons—the second of which recently concluded—the 
luxury tax rates increase dramatically for future seasons.  Beginning in 
2013-14, teams with player payrolls in excess of the luxury tax threshold 
will pay an incremental luxury tax rate based on their team salaries.64  For 
the first $5 million that a team surpasses the luxury tax threshold, it will pay 
$1.50 for each dollar over that threshold.65  For each additional $5 million 
increment that a team’s player salaries exceed the luxury tax threshold, the 
team must pay a per-dollar tax of $1.75 (for $5 million to $9,999,999), 
$2.50 (for $10 million to $14,999,999), $3.25 (for $15 million to 
$19,999,999), and $3.75 (for $20 million to $24,999,999).66 
Beginning in the 2014-15 season, the luxury tax system imposes an even 
more draconian per-dollar tax for those teams that repeatedly exceed the 
luxury tax threshold.67  A repeat offender will be a team that paid the luxury 
tax for the previous three seasons (counting backward from the 2014-15 
season) or three of the previous four seasons (from the 2015-16 season and 
thereafter).68  For those repeat offender teams, the per-dollar luxury tax 
amount for that season is increased by one dollar per increment level: $2.50 
(for the first $12.5 million over the luxury tax threshold), $2.75 (for an 
amount between $12.5 million and $13.75 million), $3.50 (for an amount 
between $13.75 million and $17.5 million), and $4.25 (for an amount 
between $17.5 million and $21.25 million).69   
While the NBPA may have anticipated robust luxury tax revenue to 
distribute from the taxpaying, big-market teams to the non-taxpaying, 
smaller-market teams, the initial results have suggested otherwise.  NBA 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Zachary Golden, Note, Is This Heaven? No, It’s I.O.U.: Why Major League 
Baseball Must Modify Its Current Revenue-Sharing and Luxury-Tax Procedures, 45 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 125, 141 n.129 (2011). 
 63. Taubin, supra note 7, at 147.  The luxury tax threshold for the 2011 Agreement is 
now 53.51% of BRI.  See Coon, supra note 38. 
 64. Krueger-Wyman, supra note 33, at 186-87. 
 65. Coon, supra note 38. 
 66. Id.  For each $5 million increment beginning at $25 million, the per-dollar luxury 
tax amount is increased by fifty cents.  Id.  This luxury tax scale continues to apply to teams 
that are not repeat luxury tax offenders in the previous three years for the 2014-15 season or, 
as of the 2015-16 season or thereafter, in three of the last four years.  Id.   
 67. See Krueger-Wyman, supra note 33, at 187. 
 68. Coon, supra note 38. 
 69. Id.  For each $5 million increment beginning at $21.25 million, the per-dollar luxury 
tax amount is increased by fifty cents.  Id. 
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teams have attempted to avoid the luxury tax, paring down their payrolls 
through various approaches.  For example, twenty of the thirty teams have 
used the one-time amnesty clause to cut a player to provide some luxury tax 
relief.70  The amnesty clause provides teams with a one-time opportunity to 
release one player whose current contract predated the 2011 Agreement, 
and thus take his salary out of salary cap and luxury tax calculations.71  The 
rather aggressive use of the amnesty clause by teams in the last two years 
demonstrates an acute interest in avoiding the luxury tax, even before the 
more draconian luxury tax provisions kick in.72   
Moreover, sensitivity to the luxury tax appears to have had a chilling 
effect on the recent free-agency market in the summer of 2013.  For 
example, Milwaukee Bucks guard Monta Ellis opted out of the final year of 
his contract—valued at $11 million for the season—and turned down an 
additional two-year extension of $25 million thinking that he could get a 
comparable or better contract through free agency.73  Instead, Ellis signed a 
three-year contract with the Dallas Mavericks that will earn him a total of 
between $25 and $30 million.74  While this is still a lucrative contract, the 
amount is between $6 and $11 million less than the contract with the 
Milwaukee Bucks that he declined.  Ellis’s contract and others like it may 
signal that teams are adjusting their free agency spending, and overall 
payroll spending, to avoid paying the luxury tax.  If true, this trend will lead 
to a drop in players’ value.  In this regard, the revenue-sharing envisioned 
by the players (and perhaps even the teams) may not come to fruition in the 
manner they expected.   
                                                                                                                 
 70. Jeff Caplan, ‘Amnesty That!’ An Amnesty Find Is Rare, NBA (July 17, 2013), 
http://hangtime.blogs.nba.com/2013/07/17/amnesty-that-an-amnesty-find-is-rare/. 
 71. Coon, supra note 38.  The team must still pay the player the amount of the salary 
less any amount paid by a team that signs that player to a new contract during the remaining 
term of the “amnestied” contract.  Id. 
 72. See, e.g., Mike Bresnahan, Lakers Waive Forward Metta World Peace Under 
Amnesty Provision, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/sports/lakersnow/la-
sp-ln-lakers-waive-metta-world-peace-20130711,0,510395.story (noting that the Los 
Angeles Lakers, a team that has consistently paid the 2005 Agreement’s luxury tax year-
after-year, used the amnesty clause to waive Metta World Peace to save approximately 
fifteen million in luxury taxes).  Moreover, of the ten remaining teams that have yet to 
exercise their rights under the amnesty clause, three of them do not have any contracts that 
are eligible to be amnestied.  Caplan, supra note 70.   
 73. Charles F. Gardner, Report: Ellis Agrees to Deal with Mavericks, JSONLINE (July 
12, 2013), http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/sports/215280211.html.  
 74. Matt Moore, Monta Ellis Agrees to Three-Year Deal with Dallas Mavericks, 
CBSSPORTS (July 12, 2013), http://www.cbssports.com/nba/blog/eye-on-basketball/2273 
4318/monta-ellis-agrees-to-three-year-deal-with-dallas-mavericks.  
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To be sure, the 2011 Agreement was not a complete disaster for the 
players; there were terms that the players could point to as being beneficial 
to their interests.  For example, under the 2011 Agreement, teams must 
spend a minimum of 85% to 90% of the salary cap as a minimum payroll 
versus merely 75% of the salary cap under the 2005 Agreement.75  
However, when one considers the four major deal points, the players made 
key concessions, the magnitude of which can be aptly described as ranging 
from significant (for the salary cap modifications), to substantial (for the 
changes in contract terms), to massive (for the reduction in BRI for the 
players).  
III. The Traditional Explanations 
Commentators posit various theories as to why the NBPA wound up 
with a relatively undesirable deal in the 2011 Agreement.  These include 
the financial strain that the lockout inflicted on players, the overestimation 
of the impact of NBA players playing overseas, and the players’ emotional 
reactions to the collective bargaining negotiations, coupled with the impact 
racial overtones had on the process.  While each of these explanations holds 
some truth, they—whether individually or collectively—do not fully 
explain the unfavorable results of the NBPA’s efforts. 
A. Financial Strain on Players 
As with most labor lockouts—whether in the setting of professional 
sports or in less high-profile industries—financial considerations and 
circumstances played a key role in negotiations.  To be sure, the NBPA 
attempted to minimize the financial impact on its members.  More than two 
years before the lockout occurred, the NBPA anticipated that the NBA 
owners would lock the players out in the summer of 2011.76  Accordingly, 
in a fifty-six-page instructional “Lockout Handbook,” the NBPA warned its 
players well in advance of the lockout to make financial arrangements to 
sustain themselves through an extended lockout that would almost certainly 
entail some cancelled games and potentially a cancelled season (with the 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Krueger-Wyman, supra note 33, at 189. 
 76. Kurt Helin, Union Head Billy Hunter Says Little Progress Made in Talks, 
NBCSPORTS (Sept. 23, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/23/union-
head-billy-hunter-says-little-progress-made-in-talks/; see also Kurt Helin, Player Reaction to 
Preseason Postponement: Saw That Coming, NBCSPORTS (Sept. 22, 2011), http://probasket 
balltalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/22/player-reaction-to-preseason-postponement-saw-that-
coming [hereinafter Helin Player Reaction] (quoting Jared Dudley as saying, “[The NBA] 
want[s] us to miss checks.  They want us to feel the burn.  We knew this.”).   
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attendant loss in income for the players).77  Players claimed that they were 
prepared for the lockout and were ready to weather the financial loss until a 
fair deal was struck between the players and owners.78  This position was 
relatively easy to take early in the lockout because players were not due to 
receive their first paychecks for the 2011-12 season until November 15, 
2011.79  Moreover, in September 2011, the players were set to receive 8% 
of their salary from the 2010-11 season as part of the NBA’s escrow 
system.80  The players thus appeared to be financially equipped for the 
lockout. 
However, it turned out that the players had not adequately insulated 
themselves from financial pressure.  Perhaps this should not come as a 
surprise, as much has been written on the precarious nature of professional 
athletes’ financial well-being.81  For example, during this same period of 
time—and in the midst of the NFL lockout—it was reported that more than 
20% of NFL players lived paycheck-to-paycheck.82  NBA players were not 
immune to this pervasive trend in professional sports: many players were 
still living paycheck-to-paycheck, despite all of the NBPA warnings over 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Mason Levinson, NBA Union Urges Players to ‘Prepare for Worst’ in Lockout 
Instruction Book, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-
11/nba-union-urges-players-to-prepare-for-worst-in-lockout-instruction-book.html. 
 78. See Helin, Player Reaction, supra note 76. 
 79. Kurt Helin, So How Does This Lockout Get Resolved?, NBCSPORTS (July 1, 2011), 
http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/01/so-how-does-this-lockout-get-resolved. 
 80. See Kurt Helin, About the Players Not Getting Paychecks . . . They Are About To, 
NBCSPORTS (Sept. 8, 2011) http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/08/about-the-
players-not-getting-paychecks%E2%80%A6-they-are-about-to/.  Under the escrow system, 
the league withholds a portion of each player’s salary in a given season to ensure that the 
players do not receive a greater percentage of BRI for that season than that to which they are 
entitled under the collective bargaining agreement.  Id.  These monies, which are put into 
escrow, are then paid to the players after the conclusion of the season and fiscal year so that 
the BRI can be calculated and the appropriate amount of withheld money returned to the 
players.  Id. 
 81. See, e.g., Pablo S. Torre, How (and Why) Athletes Go Broke, SI (Mar. 23, 2009), 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1153364 (noting, among other 
things, that within two years of retirement, 78% of former NFL players go bankrupt or 
experience severe financial hardship and that 60% of former NBA players are broke within 
five years of retirement). 
 82. Bill Briggs, NFL Owners Won’t Run Hurry-Up Offense vs. Players, MSNBC (Mar. 
2, 2011), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/41855264/ns/business-personal_finance/#.Uf6c7Rbv 
zoA. 
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the preceding several years.83  The financial vulnerability of these players 
provided leverage for the owners in the collective bargaining negotiations. 
As the lockout progressed, the NBA began to cancel preseason84 and 
then regular-season games.85  Understandably, those players living 
paycheck-to-paycheck began to bristle as they lost salary from these 
cancelled games.86  These short-term salary losses were significant given 
that the average NBA player’s career is a mere four-and-a-half years.87  
Indeed, players who were reaching the end of their careers, players who had 
been injured, and middle-of-the-road players whose lucrative contracts 
were about to expire all acutely felt the impact of cancelled games and the 
potential cancellation of the entire season.88  Some NBA players, like Kobe 
Bryant, were sufficiently concerned about the financial state of other 
players—and thus the union’s ability to keep a unified player position—that 
they offered to lend other players money if the lockout lasted an extended 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Adrian Wojnarowski, NBA Stars Face Roadblock to Play in China, YAHOO (Aug. 
15, 2011), http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news?slug=aw-wojnarowski_nba_players_china_08 
1511. 
 84. Howard Beck, The N.B.A. Cancels 43 Preseason Games, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 
2011, at D6.  
 85. Trevor E. Brice, Labor Pains on the Playing Field: Why Taking a Page from 
Europe’s Playbook Could Help the United States, 20 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 49, 60 (2013).  
There was also the more macro-level concern that the longer the lockout lasted, the more 
likely that some significant portion of the NBA’s fan base might become alienated—
resulting in a decrease in the league’s overall revenue and thus the players’ amount of BRI.  
See Kurt Helin, With NBA Lockout There Are Plenty of Losers, but It Starts with Fans, 
NBCSPORTS (July 1, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/01/with-nba-
lockout-there-are-plenty-of-losers-but-it-starts-with-fans/; see also Kurt Helin, NBA Owners 
Take Big Risk Playing Fans for Fools, NBCSPORTS (Oct. 11, 2011), http://probasketball 
talk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/11/nba-owners-take-big-risk-playing-fans-for-fools (noting that 
casual fans, angered by the lockout, might simply turn their attention and entertainment 
spending to other venues). 
 86. See Kurt Helin, Add Samardo Samuels to List of Guys Frustrated with Union, 
NBCSPORTS (Nov. 15, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/15/add-samar 
do-samuels-to-list-of-guys-frustrated-with-union/. 
 87. Ira Winderman, Winderman: Average NBA Player Can’t Miss Full Season, 
NBCSPORTS (Sept. 13, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/13/winder 
man-average-nba-player-can%e2%80%99t-miss-full-season. 
 88. Kurt Helin, Which Players Have the Most to Lose with a Long Lockout?, 
NBCSPORTS (Oct. 21, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/21/which-
players-have-the-most-to-lose-with-a-long-lockout/ (citing examples, such as Mehmet Okur, 
James Posey, and Charlie Bell, who faced significant challenges because of their inability to 
play cancelled games (or the entire season) due to the lockout). 
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period of time.89  Other players sought employment elsewhere to help 
sustain them during the lockout.  For example, after complaining about the 
lack of health insurance for himself and his family, Delonte West applied 
for a job at Home Depot before eventually taking a job stocking 
merchandize at a furniture store.90  Luke Walton took a position as an 
assistant coach for the University of Memphis’s men’s basketball team, 
with the understanding that he could leave the position and return to the 
NBA when the lockout ended.91   
Elite players, on the other hand, did not experience the same kind of 
financial pressures as many of their fellow union members.  This may have 
been due, in part, to the fact that many of them had earned more than $100 
million during their playing careers and thus were financially stable.92  
Significantly, the NBA’s elite players also had more lucrative opportunities 
during the lockout than most players.  For example, Kobe Bryant, Kevin 
Durant, and Derrick Rose reportedly earned more than $400,000—tax-
free—to play in a few exhibition games against local teams in the 
Philippines.93  Chris Paul, Dwayne Wade, and Carmelo Anthony earned a 
significant amount of money from their promotional Jordan Brand Flight 
Tour of China.94  As will be analyzed below, the dramatic difference in 
position between the NBA’s elite players and all other players may have 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Kurt Helin, Kobe Bryant Willing to Loan Players Money if Lockout Lingers, 
NBCSPORTS (Sept. 19, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/19/kobe-bry 
ant-willing-to-loan-players-money-if-lockout-lingers. 
 90. Kurt Helin, Delonte West Says He Has a Job in a Furniture Store, NBCSPORTS 
(Sept. 29, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/29/delonte-west-says-he-
has-a-job-in-a-furniture-store; Kurt Helin, Did Delonte West Apply for a Job at Home 
Depot?, NBCSPORTS (Aug. 19, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/08/19/ 
did-delonte-west-apply-for-a-job-at-home-depot. 
 91. See Brett Pollakoff, Luke Walton Hired as Assistant Coach for the University of 
Memphis, NBCSPORTS (Aug. 22, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/08/22/ 
luke-walton-hired-as-assistant-coach-for-the-university-of-memphis. 
 92. See Jonathan Abrams, The National Basketball Association’s European Vacation, 
GRANTLAND.COM (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.grantland.com/story/_/id/6784931/the-
national-basketball-association-european-vacation. 
 93. Kurt Helin, Kobe, Durant Rose Well Paid for Philippines Pickup Game, 
NBCSPORTS (July 25, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/25/kobe-
durant-rose-well-paid-for-philippines-pickup-game/. 
 94. Ken Berger, Why Have NBA’s Biggest Stars Gone Quiet at Crucial Time?, 
CBSSPORTS.COM (July 26, 2011), http://www.cbssports.com/nba/story/15356359/why-have-
nbas-biggest-stars-gone-quiet-at-crucial-time; Ira Winderman, Winderman: Challenge in 




2014]        LESSONS FROM THE NBA LOCKOUT 17 
 
 
been at the root of the internal union problems that weakened their 
collective bargaining efforts and results. 
B. The Trojan Horse: Overseas Playing Opportunities 
Some NBA players pursued opportunities to play basketball abroad.95  
The NBPA hoped to use players’ international marketability as leverage 
with the owners and thus encouraged players to sign with foreign teams.96  
In fact, NBPA Executive Director Billy Hunter praised Deron Williams for 
his one-season contract with Turkey’s Besiktas Cola Turka, claiming that 
the deal demonstrated that players would “not be intimidated by the 
league’s hard-line tactics.”97  However, it quickly became public knowledge 
that the union was advising players to negotiate an opt-out clause in their 
contracts so that they could return to play in the NBA when the lockout 
ended.98  In this regard, it is unlikely that the NBA owners felt threatened 
by these foreign contracts. 
In fact, there were several reasons why such contracts would not have 
concerned NBA owners and, perhaps more importantly, why players might 
have chosen not to enter into such contracts.  NBA players faced the risk 
that if they sustained a serious injury playing overseas, their NBA contracts, 
which would otherwise remain valid, could be voided.99  For more marginal 
players with modest contracts, playing abroad may have held some appeal; 
however, for other players with more lucrative contracts, such risks 
outweighed the financial benefits, even if they could get their contracts 
insured.100  This latter point became an issue for many NBA players, as 
foreign teams simply could not afford to insure NBA player contracts in 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Abrams, supra note 80. 
 96. Kurt Helin, Union Letter to NBA Players: Keep Looking Overseas, NBCSPORTS 
(July 13, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/13/union-letter-to-nba-
players-keep-looking-overseas/. 
 97. Howard Beck, Want to Play Abroad During the Lockout? No Problem, Says the 
Players Union, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2011, at B18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/07/14/sports/basketball/union-leaders-give-players-support-to-play-overseas.html 
(quoting Billy Hunter).  Williams’s contract contained an opt-out provision that allowed him 
to return to the NBA when the lockout concluded.  Id. 
 98. NBA Lockout: Union Memo Supports Players Going Overseas, NJ.COM (July 13, 
2011), http://www.nj.com/nets/index.ssf/2011/07/nba_lockout_union_memo_support.html. 
 99. Kurt Helin, Players Union Pushing Idea ‘Melo, Other Stars Might Play in Europe, 
NBCSPORTS (July 8, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/08/players-
union-pushing-idea-%E2%80%98melo-other-stars-might-play-in-europe/. 
 100. Kurt Helin, Don’t Expect a Flood of Top NBA Players to Europe, NBCSPORTS (July 
7, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/07/don%E2%80%99t-expect-a-
flood-of-top-nba-players-to-europe/ [hereinafter Helin, Don’t Expect a Flood]. 
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order to sign these players to overseas contracts.101  This insurance issue 
was of such importance that the NBPA even attempted to assist foreign 
teams with finding month-to-month insurance policies.102  
In addition, many foreign teams were not interested in signing NBA 
players merely for a portion of their respective seasons, as they assumed 
that players would exercise their opt-out clauses and return to the NBA.103  
In fact, the Chinese Basketball Association adopted two rules that severely 
restricted the ability, and/or interest, of NBA players to play in its league.  
First, the Chinese league only allowed teams to sign an NBA player who 
was a free agent, of which there were only 108.104  Second, the Chinese 
league prevented those free-agent NBA players from negotiating opt-out 
clauses in their Chinese league contracts.105 
Even if these various logistical hurdles did not exist, players faced 
relatively meager overseas salaries compared to their NBA pay.  Instead of 
the average player salary of $5.8 million (equaling approximately $430,000 
per month), NBA players signing contracts abroad earned, on average, 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Kurt Helin, Insurance Issues Holding Up Bogut from Playing Down Under, 
NBCSPORTS (Sept. 23, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/23/insurance-
issues-holding-up-bogut-from-playing-down-under/; see also Kurt Helin, Artest’s Great 
English Adventure May Be Done In by Insurance, NBCSPORTS (Aug. 19, 2011), http://pro 
basketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/08/19/artest%E2%80%99s-great-english-adventure-may-
be-done-in-by-insurance/ (explaining that Metta World Peace’s proposed contract with the 
Cheshire Jets in Britain fell through because the team was unable to insure his $21 million 
contract with the Los Angeles Lakers); Marc Stein, Andrew Bogut Won’t Play in Australia, 
ESPN.COM  (Oct. 6, 2011), http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/7066742/andrew-bogut-
milwaukee-bucks-deal-australian-team-agent-says (noting that the Sydney Kings could not 
afford to insure Andrew Bogut’s $39 million contract with the Milwaukee Bucks in order to 
sign him).   
 102. Kurt Helin, Union to Help Players Get Insurance if They Head Overseas, 
NBCSPORTS (July 18, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/18/union-to-
help-players-get-insurance-if-they-head-overseas/. 
 103. Kurt Helin, Europe’s Best Teams Still Hesitant to Sign NBA Stars, NBCSPORTS 
(Aug. 9, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/08/09/europe’s-best-teams-still-
hesitant-to-sign-nba-stars/.  
 104. Jon Pastuszek, CBA Bars Players with Active NBA Contracts from Playing in 
China, NIUBBALL (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.niubball.com/2011/08/cba-bars-players-
with-active-nba-contracts-from-playing-in-china/. 
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between $50,000 and $75,000 per month.106  Perhaps this is why the vast 
majority of players signing foreign contracts were “rookies, middling 
veterans, and fringe players.”107  Even those players with more lucrative 
overseas contracts earned a fraction of their NBA salaries.  Deron 
Williams’s contract—the one held out as a model by the NBPA—was 
worth $200,000 per month, merely one-tenth of his NBA contract.108  
Kenyon Martin and J.R. Smith signed with teams in the Chinese Basketball 
Association for $2.6 million and $3 million respectively,109 but those 
salaries were significantly less than the $16.5 million and $6.7 million, 
respectively, that each earned in the NBA during the 2010-11 season.110   
Finally, several NBA players who had previously played overseas 
warned their fellow union members of the cultural challenges of playing 
abroad.  For example, Josh Childress—who had spent three years playing in 
Greece before returning to play in the NBA—advised players against 
playing abroad.111  In particular, Childress noted that the more physical 
style of overseas basketball was different than in the NBA, foreign coaches 
had more power and influence than NBA coaches, and the leagues had a far 
more demanding travel schedule than the one players experienced in the 
                                                                                                                 
 106. Howard Beck, A Lot of Talk, but Few Stars Have Left the Country to Play, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2011, at B14, available at   http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/sports/ 
basketball/nba-lockout-few-stars-join-foreign-teams.html. 
 107. Id.  Even for the player whose salary was the $1 million minimum veteran’s salary, 
playing abroad may have posed too great a risk. 
 108. Helin, Don’t Expect a Flood, supra note 100.  Williams’s deal covered housing 
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contract paled in comparison to his NBA contract.  See id. 
 109. Kurt Helin, J.R. Smith’s Demands Have Chinese Team Frustrated, NBCSPORTS 
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 110. Christopher Dempsey, Kenyon Martin Simmers over Lack of Contract Extension 
Offer from Nuggets, DENVER POST, Sept. 30, 2010, http://blogs.denverpost.com/nuggets/ 
2010/09/30/kenyon-martin-simmers-over-lack-of-contract-extension-offer-from-nuggets/17 
14/ (noting Martin’s $16.5 million salary for the 2010-11 season); Marc Stein, Sources: 
Mavs Chasing Prince, Smith, ESPN (Feb. 24, 2011), http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/ 
post/_/id/25316/sources-mavs-chasing-prince-smith (noting Smith’s 2010-11 salary of $6.7 
million). 
 111. Kurt Helin, Suns’ Childress Doesn’t Get NBA Players Talking Europe, NBCSPORTS 
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NBA.112  In addition, those players that did play overseas reported facing 
various difficulties related to living in a foreign country: housing, travel 
accommodations, food, language, communication style, and other simple 
activities of daily living.113  
For all of these reasons, the leverage that the NBPA expected from the 
threat of NBA players playing overseas never materialized.  What seemed 
like a negotiating tool in concept turned out to be, in reality, a relatively 
unattractive alternative path for players—one riddled with logistical flaws 
and minimal remunerative upside. 
C. Players’ Emotional Reactions and the Racial Overtones of the 
Negotiations 
Another popular explanation for why the players suffered significant 
losses in the 2011 Agreement was that they became too emotional during 
the negotiations.114  Many commentators believed that the players failed to 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Id.; Kurt Helin, European Veteran Warns: This Isn’t Like the NBA, NBCSPORTS 
(July 22, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/22/european-veteran-warns-
this-isnt-like-the-nba/.  At least one NBA player, Ty Lawson, had difficulty adjusting to the 
more physical style of play and even tweeted about his frustration.  Kurt Helin, Ty Lawson 
Lashes out on Twitter; Adjusting to Europe Not Easy, NBCSPORTS (Oct. 25, 2011), http:// 
probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/25/ty-lawson-lashes-out-on-twitter-adjusting-to-
europe-not-easy/. 
 113. See, e.g., Kurt Helin, J.J. Hickson Is One Game and Done in Israel, NBCSPORTS 
(Nov. 4, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/04/j-j-hickson-is-one-game-
and-done-in-israel/ (noting how J.J. Hickson’s Israeli team, Bnei Hasharon, released him 
after he was late to practice); Guan Weijia, Weijia Column: J.R. Smith Adjusting Slowly to 
China, SHERIDANHOOPS (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.sheridanhoops.com/2011/10/26/weijia-
column-j-r-smith-adjusting-slowly-to-china (explaining J.R. Smith’s frustration with a 
Chinese censorship policy that made it difficult for him to use Twitter); Deron Williams, 
D’Will’s Turkey Diary, Part 1: The Transition, ESPN (Oct. 7, 2011), http://espn.go.com/ 
blog/new-york/new-jersey-nets/post/_/id/1940/d-wills-turkey-diary-part-1-the-transition 
(describing the challenging transition that he and his family faced in Turkey, including 
finding housing and road travel for away games); Nima Zarrabi, Austin Daye: “I’m Eager to 
Come Home”, HOOPSHYPE (Nov. 10, 2011), http://hoopshype.com/blogs/zarrabi/austin-
daye-im-eager-to-come-home (noting Austin Daye’s troubles with the language barrier and 
food in Moscow).  
 114. See, e.g., Kurt Helin, It Was Players’ Idea to Decertify, but Did They Really 
Understand?, NBCSPORTS (Nov. 15, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/ 
15/it-was-players%E2%80%99-idea-to-decertify-but-did-they-really-understand/ 
[hereinafter Helin, Players’ Idea to Decertify]; Matt Moore, Dear Mr. Thomas: A Response 
to Etan Thomas’ Op-Ed, NBCSPORTS (Nov. 13, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports. 
com/2011/11/13/dear-mr-thomas-a-response-to-etan-thomas-op-ed/ [hereinafter Moore, 
Dear Mr. Thomas]. 
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execute a well-devised strategy during the lockout because they allowed 
NBA Commissioner David Stern’s comments to get to them.115  One 
reporter characterized the players’ approach during the lockout as irrational, 
comparing them to an innocent man who refused to take a plea bargain in a 
criminal case even though it would be in his best interest to do so.116  
Indeed, there appears to be a fair amount of evidence to support this 
characterization. 
Even before the lockout began, players seemed to feel insulted and 
exploited by the NBA owners.  In an opinion piece published in late June of 
2011, Etan Thomas—the NBPA Executive First Vice President—called the 
owners greedy for pursuing a hard salary cap, nonguaranteed contracts, and 
other economic concessions in the 2011 Agreement.117  Thomas strongly 
resisted the idea that the owners had conceded anything when they backed 
off of their push for nonguaranteed contracts.118  In particular, Thomas 
stated, “This cannot be a starting point for us.  They have in essence tried to 
insult our intelligence by making us think that something they have ‘given 
us’ is a slam dunk when in reality its [sic] very far from progress.”119  As 
the two sides headed into the lockout, it was evident that some players felt 
as though the owners were not negotiating in good faith. 
As the lockout wore on, players’ belief that the owners were exploiting 
them became more prevalent.120  In response to the owners’ take-it-or-
leave-it negotiating style, Tyson Chandler compared the owners to dictators 
for demanding a 50-50 split in BRI, even after the players had expressed a 
willingness to give up several percentage points from the 57% they enjoyed 
under the 2005 Agreement.121  Towards the end of October 2011, NBPA 
Executive Director Billy Hunter pursued this theme further by stating that 
                                                                                                                 
 115. See Moore, Dear Mr. Thomas, supra note 114.  
 116. Id. 
 117. Etan Thomas, United We Stand, HOOPSHYPE (June 27, 2011), http://hoopshype. 
com/blogs/thomas/united-we-stand. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.  Thomas, in addressing the owners’ proposal of a flexible salary cap—which 
Thomas equated to a hard salary cap—wrote, “They are trying to bamboozle us and really 
it’s insulting.” Id. 
 120. See, e.g., Kurt Helin, NBA Players Take to Twitter to Make Their Case, Call 
Owners Greedy, NBCSPORTS (Oct. 20, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/ 
10/20/nba-players-take-to-twitter-to-make-their-case/. 
 121. Kurt Helin, Tyson Chandler Says Owners are Negotiating Like “Dictators”, 
NBCSPORTS (Oct. 24, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/24/tyson-
chandler-says-owners-are-negotiating-like-%E2%80%9Cdictators%E2%80%9D/. 
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the players did not want “to be totally exploited” by the owners.122  Then in 
November 2011, Etan Thomas again weighed in on the owners’ bargaining 
position, saying that the owners—whom Thomas labeled as part of 
America’s wealthiest one percent—felt entitled to tell the players what to 
do.123  Several commentators similarly found the owners’ actions to be 
particularly egregious.  For example, one reporter wrote that there was “no 
‘bargaining’ going on . . . just extortion.”124  Another commentator 
admonished the owners to “stop hurling alley-oops when they’re up by 30 
with two minutes left in the fourth quarter, trying to push the margin to 
40.”125  Some analysts even called on the owners to extend an olive branch 
to the players, allowing the players to save face and accept a deal.126  
Moreover, many players seriously doubted the owners’ claims that 
draconian changes were necessary for the 2011 Agreement.127  These 
players did not find the necessary correlation between the need to boost 
struggling teams’ revenue and a dramatic cut in players’ salaries.128  Here, 
too, the players’ views were supported by other sources.  For example, the 
NBPA’s consultant, Kevin Murphy—a University of Chicago economics 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Kurt Helin, Union Head Hunter: “We Don’t Want to Be Totally Exploited”, 
NBCSPORTS (Oct. 24, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/24/union-head-
hunter-%E2%80%9Cwe-dont-want-to-be-totally-exploited%E2%80%9D (quoting Billy 
Hunter). 
 123. Etan Thomas, NBA Labor-Negotiation Questions, ESPN (Nov. 12, 2011), 
http://espn.go.com/espn/commentary/story/_/id/7223340/etan-thomas-questions-nba-labor-
negotiations. 
 124. Matt Moore, The Real Problem on the Players’ Side in This Fight, NBCSPORTS 
(Nov. 12, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/12/the-real-problem-on-the-
players-side-in-this-fight [hereinafter Moore, The Real Problem]. 
 125. Kurt Helin, Talking Decertification, Union Moves with CBA Expert Larry Coon, 
NBCSPORTS (Nov. 7, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/07/talking-
decertification-union-moves-with-cba-expert-larry-coon/ (quoting Larry Coon). 
 126. Id.  Even after the two sides reached a tentative deal for the 2011 Agreement, some 
commentators lamented that the players wound up taking a significant pay cut—finding it 
undeserved.  See, e.g., Dave Zirin, NBA Lockout Ends and Players Get Played, NATION 
(Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/blog/164822/nba-lockout-ends-and-players-get-
played. 
 127. See, e.g., Kurt Helin, Bulls Kyle Korver Calls Lockout a “Shame”, NBCSPORTS 
(July 20, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/20/bulls-kyle-korver-calls-
lockout-a-%E2%80%9Cshame%E2%80%9D/. 
 128. See Kurt Helin, NBA Owners Could Vote to Approve Lockout Tuesday, NBCSPORTS 
(June 28, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/06/28/nba-owners-could-vote-
to-approve-lockout-tuesday/.  Instead, players called on the more financially secure teams to 
make concessions—through better revenue sharing—to help teams that were struggling 
financially.  See id. 
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professor—agreed with the players’ beliefs about the owners’ financial 
situation, arguing that the teams’ descriptions of their financial problems 
were exaggerated.129  Specifically, Dr. Murphy explained that NBA owners 
were making money on their investments in their teams even when they 
experienced budget losses in a given year.130  He described how the 
appreciation in the value of the franchise surpassed the yearly cash-flow 
losses teams experienced.131 
Dr. Murphy also pointed out that while any team owner who bought in 
2007 or thereafter likely suffered operating losses, prior to 2007, owners 
enjoyed 8% to 9% returns on their investment each year.132  He thus argued 
that it was unfair to hold the players accountable for the recent losses when 
the players were not considered responsible—nor rewarded—for the earlier, 
more lucrative years.133  Even if the players should have had to make up for 
the owners’ losses, Dr. Murphy explained that if the players agreed to take 
52.5% of BRI—a figure higher than that at which they ultimately wound 
up—that concession would more than cover the owners’ losses.134  While 
an economist for the NBA owners would have, no doubt, disputed Dr. 
Murphy’s findings, his research provided important fodder for the players’ 
strong belief that the owners were taking advantage of them. 
Another factor related to the imbalance of power between the owners and 
the players may well have affected the players’ feelings and actions during 
the collective bargaining negotiations: race.  As described above, both 
before and during the lockout, players believed that the owners were not 
negotiating in good faith.  The players also felt as though the owners were 
rigid and sought to unilaterally dictate their preferred terms rather than 
                                                                                                                 
 129. See Steve Aschburner, Renowned Economist Murphy Lends Smarts to NBPA Cause, 
NBA (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.nba.com/2011/news/features/steve_aschburner/10/27/ 
lockout-q-and-a-kevin-murphy/index.html. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See id.  Dr. Murphy explained why this was an advantageous position for team 
owners and thus why their arguments regarding financial losses were, in his estimation, 
disingenuous: 
[Y]ou’ve got a tax loss annually on your operating and you’ve got a capital 
gain at the end that you accumulate untaxed until you sell it and then pay a 
lower rate.  So you get a deferred tax treatment on the gains and an immediate 
tax treatment on the losses . . . . 
Id. (quoting Dr. Murphy). 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See id. 
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earnestly engage in collective bargaining negotiations.135  This tension was 
exacerbated by the fact that the vast majority of owners were white, and a 
significant majority of players were African American.136  Some 
commentators found the dynamic to be reminiscent of the power imbalance 
between whites and African Americans dating back to slavery.137  Indeed, 
after a federal mediator declared that there was “no useful purpose” for 
continuing mediation between the two sides in late October,138 journalist 
Bryant Gumbel made the following provocative editorial comments 
regarding NBA Commissioner David Stern:  
[Stern’s] efforts were typical of a commissioner, who has always 
seemed eager to be viewed as some kind of modern plantation 
overseer treating NBA men as if they were his boys.  It’s part of 
Stern’s M.O.  Like his past self-serving edicts on dress code or 
the questioning of officials, his moves are intended to do little 
more than show how he’s the one keeping the hired hands in 
their place.139   
Gumbel took significant criticism from various analysts—from former 
players to sports reporters—for his comments.140  However, others found 
                                                                                                                 
 135. See Kurt Helin, Players Union VP Mo Evans Still Talking Tough. Great., 
NBCSPORTS (Oct. 13, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/13/players-
union-vp-mo-evans-still-talking-tough-great/. 
 136. See Mike Wise, NBA Lockout: Negotiations Could Be Hijacked by Racial 
Perceptions, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/wizards/ 
nba-lockout-negotiations-could-be-hijacked-by-racial-perceptions/2011/10/21/gIQAXWyc 
3L_story.html (explaining that the negotiating table included owners, with the exception of 
Michael Jordan, who were white and ranged in age from forty to eighty, and players who 
were 84% African American and in their twenties and thirties). 
 137. See, e.g., Kurt Helin, Bryant Gumbel Compares David Stern to “Plantation 
Overseer”, NBCSPORTS (Oct. 19, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/19/ 
bryant-gumbel-compares-david-stern-to-%E2%80%9Cplantation-overseer%E2%80%9D/ 
[hereinafter Helin, Bryant Gumbel Compares]. 
 138. See Kurt Helin, Mediator Says “No Useful Purpose” to Continue Labor Talks, 
NBCSPORTS (Oct. 20, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/20/mediator-
says-%E2%80%9Cno-useful-purpose%E2%80%9D-to-continue-labor-talks/ (quoting 
federal mediator George Cohen). 
 139. Helin, Bryant Gumbel Compares, supra note 137 (quoting Gumbel’s closing 
comments from an episode of HBO’s Real Sports with Bryant Gumbel).  
 140. See, e.g., Kurt Helin, Add Barkley to List of People Slamming Bryant Gumbel, 
NBCSPORTS (Oct. 20, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/20/add-
barkley-to-list-of-people-slamming-bryant-gumbel/ (describing TV analyst and former NBA 
player Charles Barkley’s opinion that millionaire basketball players could not be accurately 
described as slaves and that the Commissioner was merely doing his job); Shaun Powell, 
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truth in Gumbel’s “plantation overseer” remark.141  Both before and after 
Gumbel’s comments, many players (and those non-players working with 
the NBPA) made similar off-the-record comments.142  Indeed, some saw 
racial tensions running through the entire collective bargaining talks and 
negotiations.143  One reported instance of conflict between Commissioner 
Stern and Dwayne Wade of the Miami Heat demonstrated this view.  
During negotiations—and several weeks before Gumbel made his 
comments—Stern allegedly pointed his finger at the players at the 
bargaining table while making an argument.144  In response, Wade raised 
his voice and yelled, “‘You’re not pointing your finger at me.  I’m not your 
child.’”145  Players—many of whom felt patronized by Stern—reveled in 
the news of Wade’s rebuke of the Commissioner.146 
These strong feelings about the racial overtones of Stern’s actions should 
not necessarily come as a surprise to those who follow the NBA, as there 
have been a number of controversies in recent years.  The most prominent 
one occurred prior to the 2005-06 season when the NBA adopted a dress 
code that applies to players when sitting in the stands during a game, 
participating in a media interview or in team or league activities or events, 
                                                                                                                 
Bryant Gumbel Should’ve Known Better, ESPN (Oct. 24, 2011), http://espn.go.com/new-
york/nba/story/_/id/7126679/bryant-gumbel-unfairly-labeled-nba-commissioner-david-stern 
(defending Commissioner Stern by calling him “the most progressive commissioner in 
sports” and reminding readers that the Commissioner pushed for African American 
ownership within the NBA and helped make scores of African American men rich); Mike 
Raffone, HBO Sports Must “Get Real” with Bryant Gumbel for NBA Slavery Remarks, 
BLEACHERREPORT (Oct. 19, 2011), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/902079-hbo-sports-
must-get-real-with-bryant-gumbel-for-nba-slavery-remarks (disputing Gumbel’s slavery 
remark based on players’ salaries). 
 141. See generally WILLIAM RHODEN, FORTY MILLION DOLLAR SLAVES: THE RISE, FALL, 
AND REDEMPTION OF THE BLACK ATHLETE (2006) (arguing that systemic racism endures in 
the world of sports because, despite players’ significant salaries, an old dynamic persists: 
African American athletes supply the talent—but have little control over their professional 
lives—while the rich white owners and officials retain all of the power). 
 142. Helin, Bryant Gumbel Compares, supra note 137; see also Henry Abbott, David 
Stern and the Plantation, ESPN (Oct. 19, 2011), http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/ 
id/32634/david-stern-and-the-plantation (explaining that persons associated with the players 
believed that underlying the dispute was the players’ determination to correct the historically 
exploitative relationship between white and African-American men). 
 143. Abbott, supra note 142. 
 144. Kurt Helin, Report: Dwyane Wade Yelled at Stern During Labor Talks, NBCSPORTS 
(Oct. 1, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/01/report-dwyane-wade-
yelled-at-stern-during-labor-talks. 
 145. Id. (quoting Wade). 
 146. Id. 
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and sitting on the team’s bench during the game when they were ineligible 
to play.147  The dress code requires players to wear business casual attire 
during these times and explicitly forbids players to wear popular items such 
as sleeveless shirts, shorts, T-shirts, jerseys, sunglasses, headphones, 
headgear, chains, pendants, or medallions.148 
Stern justified the new dress code by arguing that it was appropriate for 
players to demonstrate a level of professionalism.149  However, others 
viewed the dress code as having racial overtones.  One scholar noted that 
many of the clothes and accessories that NBA players liked to wear were 
banned under the dress code.150  The banned attire (clothing associated with 
hip-hop style) was negatively stereotyped and, at the same time, associated 
with a particular race—African Americans—and thus “race had to be a 
motivating factor and contributed to Commissioner Stern’s decision to 
institute a dress code.”151  Indeed, while many supporters of the dress code 
never used the words “black” or “African American” when criticizing the 
attire that the dress code aimed to eliminate, it was evident that there were 
concerns that aspects of African American culture—what many conflated 
with hip-hop dress—were deemed problematic for the NBA’s image.152  In 
this regard, the dress code and its supporters sought to limit the impact of 
young, black players on the NBA culture and to ensure that the players 
comported with the views and values of the NBA’s predominantly white 
audience.153   
NBA players certainly viewed the new dress code in this light.  Paul 
Pierce argued that the dress code targeted “part of our culture,”154 and one 
commentator argued that some players believe players should distinguish 
                                                                                                                 
 147. Max N. Panoff, Note, Black, Tie Optional: How the NBA’s Dress Code Violates 
Title VII, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 275, 278-79 (2009).  See generally NBA Player Dress 
Code, NBA (Oct. 20, 2005), http://www.nba.com/news/player_dress_code_051017.html 
(last visited Aug. 17, 2013).  
 148. R. Richard Banks, Class and Culture: The Indeterminacy of Nondiscrimination, 5 
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 3 (2009); see also NBA Player Dress Code, supra note 147.  
 149. Jeffrey A. Williams, Flagrant Foul: Racism in “The Ron Artest Fight”, 13 UCLA 
ENT. L. REV. 55, 87 (2005). 
 150. Panoff, supra note 147, at 282. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See Peter Hogarth, Racial Ideology and Discourse in the NBA: Ron Artest and the 
Construction of Black Bodies by White America, STREAM: CULTURE/POLITICS/TECHNOLOGY, 
Spring 2008, at 53, 62, available at http://journals.sfu.ca/cpt/index.php/stream/article%20/ 
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 153. Id. at 60. 
 154. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Volunteer Discrimination, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895, 
1904 (2007) (quoting Pierce). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss1/1
2014]        LESSONS FROM THE NBA LOCKOUT 27 
 
 
themselves from the negative stereotypes of blacks as being “bad 
outsiders.”155  Stephen Jackson echoed this sentiment by claiming that the 
dress code made “a racial statement” and that aspects of the requirements—
like banning players from wearing chains—were directly targeted at black 
players.156  These racial tensions were only exacerbated by the perception 
that white owners, fans, and merchandisers appeared to target the dress of 
black athletes.157 
Two other controversies that preceded the 2011 Agreement also help 
explain why the players felt that race played a role in their negotiations with 
the owners.  The first was when the NBA banned its players from certain 
nightclubs that it deemed ill-suited for players to attend.158  If players 
attended one of these nightclubs, they faced league discipline, including a 
substantial fine.159  Many viewed the nightclub ban as being paternalistic 
and fueling the racial tension between the white owners and African 
American players.160  The second controversy involved the NBA’s push for 
a minimum age for players—nineteen years old or one year after high 
school graduation—which it successfully negotiated into the 2005 
Agreement.161  Some scholars viewed this rule as racially motivated.162  
Indeed, there is a strong argument that the rule has had a disproportionate 
effect on black athletes because none of the players that entered the NBA 
draft straight from high school were white.163  One scholar argued that the 
                                                                                                                 
 155. Id. at 1901.  
 156. Id. at 1904 (quoting Jackson). 
 157. Mark R. Bandsuch, The NBA Dress Code and Other Fashion Faux Pas Under Title 
VII, 16 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 19 (2009).  
 158. Brent D. Showalter, Technical Foul: David Stern’s Excessive Use of Rule-Making 
Authority, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 205, 212 (2007). 
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 160. See, e.g., Michael McCann, NBA Activates Its “Security Forces” to Prohibit 
Players From Frequenting Nightclubs, SPORTS L. BLOG (Jan. 21, 2007), http://sports-
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 161. Daniel A. Applegate, Comment, The NBA Gets a College Education: An Antitrust 
and Labor Analysis of the NBA’s Minimum Age Limit, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 825, 829 
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NBA’s various rationales for the minimum age requirement—the long-term 
financial interest of players, the importance of education, and the 
immaturity of early draft entrants, and among others—were merely 
pretextual for the racist intent behind the rule.164  Players certainly seemed 
to view the minimum age requirement as being racist.165   
Understandably, these kinds of recent controversies influenced how 
players viewed the actions of Commissioner Stern and NBA owners during 
the collective bargaining negotiations in 2011.  However, the racial tension 
between the players and owners can be traced to an ongoing, underlying 
power struggle that dates back some fifty years or more.  For example, in 
1964, NBA players refused to leave their locker room and play in the All-
Star game until the NBA recognized the players’ union and promised to 
provide a pension plan.166  Similar to the players’ sentiment in 1964, the 
players’ perspective during the 2011 lockout may have been not only about 
money, but also about power—in particular, the power of the individual 
NBA player.167  As one commentator pointed out,  
The teams want to be the brand, the product, the market, the 
control.  They want the players to be the asset, the employee, the 
robotic function of the system the team structure creates.  You 
can argue [the] end point is about money.  But it also speaks to 
ideological divides over whether the young, yes, in most cases 
black athlete should have the strength and power to determine 
his or her own basketball destiny.168   
Star players such as Kevin Garnett, Carmelo Anthony, and especially 
LeBron James fought hard to control their own respective destinies and in 
                                                                                                                 
 164. Kenneth Casey Allison, Unconscious Racism and the NBA 16-22 (Dec. 4, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1574935.  
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the process disrupted the status quo in the NBA by leaving one team to join 
another (either by forcing a trade or via free agency).169 
James, in particular, received venomous criticism for choosing to leave 
the Cleveland Cavaliers for the Miami Heat in the summer of 2010.170  Part 
of this criticism was likely deserved given the questionable way in which he 
announced his free agency choice: The Decision.171  At the same time, it is 
easy to see how some of the criticism may have been viewed as racially 
motivated.  For example, Cleveland Cavaliers owner Dan Gilbert’s vitriolic 
response to James’s choice of a new team was met with charges by the 
Reverend Jesse Jackson that Gilbert had a “slave master mentality” and that 
Gilbert viewed James as “a runaway slave.”172  Gilbert denied the charges, 
but one thing was clear: he railed vociferously against James’s 
empowerment as a free agent to choose where he would play basketball and 
earn his living.173  Indeed, as one commentator noted, James built upon the 
power of free agency that was fought for by past NBA stars like Bill 
Russell and Oscar Robertson, and “showed that a player can enter free 
agency, and not only go where he wants, but get a sign-and-trade to get the 
extra year he wants on the deal, and do it alongside two of his best 
friends.”174  Through his decision, James almost single-handedly shifted the 
NBA’s balance of power from Cleveland to Miami.175 
Many NBA analysts believed that the owners’ frustration with the 
players’ newfound sense of empowerment fueled both the owners’ 
bargaining positions and several of the more controversial points of 
contention during the lockout.176  Indeed, one could easily view the owners’ 
                                                                                                                 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Matt Moore, Like It or Not, LeBron James’ ‘Decision’ Is All Part of the Plan, 
and It’s Working, NBCSPORTS (July 7, 2010), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2010/ 
07/07/like-it-or-not-lebron-james-decision-is-all-part-of-the-plan-and-its-working/. 
 171. See Henry Abbott, LeBron James’ Decision: The Transcript, ESPN (July 8, 2010), 
http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/id/17853/lebron-james-decision-the-transcript. 
 172. Bill Hutchinson, Jesse Jackson Slams Cavaliers’ Owner Dan Gilbert for Treating 
LeBron James Like a ‘Runaway Slave’, NYDAILYNEWS (July 12, 2010), http://www. 
nydailynews.com/news/national/jesse-jackson-slams-cavaliers-owner-dan-gilbert-treating-
lebron-james-runaway-slave-article-1.467775 (quoting Rev. Jesse Jackson).   
 173. See Letter from Dan Gilbert, Owner, Cleveland Cavaliers to Fans (July 8, 2010), 
available at http://www.nba.com/cavaliers/news/gilbert_letter_100708.html.  
 174. Moore, NBA Lockout: LeBron James, supra note 166.  
 175. Id. 
 176. See Henry Abbott, The Moment the Talks Fell Apart, ESPN (Oct. 15, 2011), http:// 
espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/id/32504/the-moment-the-talks-fell-apart (discussing how 
LeBron James waived the status quo with “The Decision,” thus inspiring other players to act 
with a similar sense of empowerment during the lockout); Boyce Watkins, Bryant Gumbel, 
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desire to shorten player contracts, impose extreme luxury tax penalties, 
reform Larry Bird free agency rights, and eliminate sign-and-trade contracts 
as not only related to financial concerns, but also motivated by a desire to 
collectively regain power and control over the players.177  When 
considering such a power struggle, racial implications cannot be 
overlooked.  They add another dimension to the dynamic—one with 
palpable, historical roots.178  When viewed in this context, the parties’ 
passionate fight over a few percentage points of BRI, and the players’ 
willingness to lose salary and revenue during the lockout, is more 
understandable.  At the same time, the players’ repeated insistence on a 
“fair deal” also takes on a more complex meaning, with implications 
reaching beyond the mere economics of the 2011 Agreement. 
This context of the players’ frustrations and the racial overtones of the 
collective bargaining negotiations help explain why some viewed the 
players as emotional to the point of making irrational decisions regarding 
their approach to the lockout and their bargaining position.  Some evidence 
seems to support this characterization.  For example, toward the end of the 
lockout, the NBPA faced a critical juncture and, by many accounts, acted 
foolishly.  On November 10, 2011, during a time of great unrest within the 
player ranks,179 Stern sought to circumvent NBPA leadership and persuade 
the players directly to accept the owners’ latest offer.180  In a memo that he 
posted on NBC.com, Stern explained the offer as having a 50-50 BRI split, 
expanding the market for mid-level players, permitting unlimited use of the 
Bird free agent exception, allowing sign-and-trade contacts for non-
taxpaying teams, and permitting “an active free agent market and greater 
                                                                                                                 
David Stern and the NBA Plantation, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 22, 2011, http://www.huffing 
tonpost.com/dr-boyce-watkins/bryant-gumbel-nba-plantation_b_1021116.html (“Both the 
NCAA and NBA are . . . groups of rich and powerful white men seeking to control the 
economic options of a group of young black men. . . . David Stern and men like him are 
accustomed to calling the shots and controlling Black men . . . .”). 
 177. Moore, NBA Lockout: LeBron James, supra note 166 (“It’s fine to market those 
stars, to demand they smile for promos, do all the appearances, act and dress the way the 
owners need them to in order to make the league more popular.  But those same players 
can’t control what happens in the league.  That has to be the owners’ prerogative, in their 
minds.”). 
 178. Id. 
 179. See infra text accompanying notes 369-397. 
 180. Kurt Helin, In Latest Attempt to Sway, David Stern Has Memo for Players, 
NBCSPORTS (Nov. 14, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/14/in-latest-
attempt-to-sway-david-stern-has-memo-for-players/. 
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player movement.”181  Stern hoped, in turn, that the rank-and-file players 
would pressure the NBPA to convene a vote on the proposed deal.182   
The NBPA, instead, avoided such a vote and limited discussion of the 
proposal to team representatives and NBPA executive committee 
members.183  Many commentators expected that the NBPA would modify 
the offer (making it more acceptable to the players), approve the modified 
offer, and then send it back to the owners for consideration.184  Or, if it 
wanted to reject the offer but attempt to gain leverage on the owners, the 
union could have also begun the lengthier, player-initiated vote on 
decertification.185  However, there is no evidence that the union carefully 
considered these alternatives.  Instead—and to the surprise of many—on 
November 14, 2011, the team representatives rejected the latest offer and 
started the union decertification process by sending the NBA a notice of 
disclaimer (stating that it would no longer represent players in the collective 
bargaining negotiations).186  Players hired attorneys and became 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Id. 
 182. Kurt Helin, Powerpoint Version of League’s Offer Players Will Soon Reject, 
NBCSPORTS (Nov. 14, 2011) http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/14/powerpoint-
version-of-leagues-offer-players-will-soon-reject/ [hereinafter Helin, Powerpoint Version]. 
 183. Kurt Helin, Stern Gives Players New Ultimatum Offer for 72-Game Season, 
NBCSPORTS (Nov. 10, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/10/stern-
gives-players-new-ultimatum-offer-for-72-game-season/ [hereinafter Helin, Stern Gives 
Players New Ultimatum]. 
 184. Helin, Powerpoint Version, supra note 182. 
 185. Helin, Players’ Idea to Decertify, supra note 114.  The player-initiated vote on 
decertification is a different process for decertification than the disclaimer of interest 
approach. Id. 
 186. See Kurt Helin, Players Vote to Reject Offer, Decertify Union. Season Likely 
Doomed., NBCSPORTS (Nov. 14, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/14/ 
players-vote-to-reject-offer-disband-union-season-likely-doomed/ [hereinafter Helin, 
Players Vote to Reject Offer].  Employees can choose to dissolve their union either through 
decertification or by a disclaimer of interest.  Gabriel Feldman, Antitrust Versus Labor Law 
in Professional Sports: Balancing the Scales After Brady v. NFL and Anthony v. NBA, 45 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1255-56 (2012).  Decertification requires that 30% or more of 
union members sign cards stating that they do not want their union to continue to represent 
them.  Id. at 1256 n.197.  An election is thus held, and if a majority of employees votes to 
decertify the union, the employees will no longer be represented by the union after the vote.  
Id.  A disclaimer of interest, on the other hand, “occurs when a showing has been made that 
more than 50% of the employees in the union do not wish to be represented by the union.”  
Id.  The NBPA was under intense pressure to decertify at this point of the lockout.  See Kurt 
Helin, Where Things Stand as Kobe, Stars Show up for Union Meeting, NBCSPORTS (Nov. 
14, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/14/where-things-stand-as-kobe-
stars-show-up-for-union-meeting/ (explaining that the hard-liners within the union claimed 
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plaintiffs.187  The NBPA was forced to withdraw its unfair labor practices 
complaint against the owners, and it was expected that the league would 
challenge the disclaimer of interest as a sham.188   
Indeed, those following the lockout viewed decertification as a 
negotiating tactic on the part of the players to move the owners off of their 
hardline bargaining stance.189  The union also had strategic reasons for the 
disclaimer of interest; it thought that such a move would satisfy the hardline 
players and agents.190  Interestingly, many agents that represented players 
were actually shocked that the union chose the disclaimer of interest 
method of decertification.191  One reason for this surprise was that the 
disclaimer of interest approach proceeds rather quickly—which would seem 
to be against the players’ interest.192  If the players had, instead, petitioned 
for a vote on decertification, there would have been a forty-five day period 
before the actual vote.193  This time period could have then been used for 
further negotiations with the owners—with the leverage of the looming 
decertification vote.194  Instead, the union may have purposely avoided the 
player-initiated method for fear that once the players convened for the vote, 
they would have rejected decertification and accepted Stern’s latest 
proposal—something that union leadership did not want the players to 
do.195 
                                                                                                                 
to have seventy more player signatures on a petition than it needed for a vote to decertify but 
said that they would wait until the union meeting had occurred before filing the papers).   
 187. Helin, Players Vote to Reject Offer, supra note 186.  
 188. See Kurt Helin, Fisher, Hunter Send Letter to Players Explaining Process, 
NBCSPORTS (Nov. 14, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/14/fisher-
hunter-send-letter-to-players-explaining-process/ [hereinafter Helin, Fisher, Hunter Send 
Letter].  If the NBPA had been successful in its unfair labor practices complaint, the 
National Labor Relations Board may have attempted to enjoin the NBA from continuing the 
lockout.  See Grow, supra note 3, at 495.   
 189. See, e.g., Helin, Fisher, Hunter Send Letter, supra note 188. 
 190. Matt Moore, Stern Responds to Allegations He’s Not Bluffing by Saying He’s Not 
Bluffing, NBCSPORTS (Nov. 13, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/13/ 
stern-responds-to-allegations-hes-not-bluffing-by-saying-hes-not-bluffing/. 
191. Liz Mullin, Agents Surprised by Disclaimer, Keep Options Open, SPORTS BUS. J. 
(Nov. 21, 2011), http://m.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2011/11/21/Labor-and-
Agents/NBA-agents.aspx. 
 192. Helin, Players’ Idea to Decertify, supra note 114. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Kurt Helin, NBA Union Did Not Poll Players Before Taking Big Step Monday, 
NBCSPORTS (Nov. 14, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/14/nba-union-
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Poll Players]. 
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When the media questioned the disclaimer of interest method, union 
leadership claimed that it was the players’ idea to decertify.196  This 
response made many question whether the players really understood the 
ramifications of filing a disclaimer of interest.197  In fact, one commentator 
portrayed the player representatives as naïve and unsophisticated, with not 
many of them “know[ing] the difference between a disclaimer of interest, 
decertification and ‘Dancing with the Stars.’”198  Some players seemed to 
validate this view.  For example, Paul Pierce—an informal leader among 
the players behind the push to decertify—when asked whether he agreed 
with the disclaimer of interest, said that he was not sure if it was the right 
move.199  Pierce seemed to defer to the expertise of NBPA Executive 
Director Billy Hunter and the union’s lawyers.200  More importantly, Pierce 
later appeared to indicate that the players were frustrated and may have 
acted rashly without thinking through the decision:  
I don’t know if [disclaimer of interest is] the right move or 
[forced] decertification is the right move or sitting at the table is 
the right move.  We weren’t getting nowhere at the negotiation 
table.  The players felt like they were giving, giving, giving 
while the owners were taking all the concessions.201   
In this regard, the disclaimer of interest decision could easily be viewed as 
stemming from the players’ sense of powerlessness and frustration—and 
deference to union leadership—rather than from an informed decision-
making process.  In light of the historic power imbalance between the 
owners and players and the racial tensions that flared at various points 
during the negotiations and in the past between the two sides, one might 
also fairly view the players’ decision as a rash and perhaps irrational 
                                                                                                                 
 196. Helin, Players’ Idea to Decertify, supra note 114. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Adrian Wojnarowski, Stern, Hunter Lose Sight of NBA Season, YAHOO (Nov. 15, 
2011), http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news?slug=aw-wojnarowski_nba_labor_players_owners 
_111511 (“As it usually goes in labor talks, whoever gets the players’ ears last can talk them 
in and out of almost any directive.  The agents were locked out, cell phone confiscated at the 
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 199. Marc J. Spears, Paul Pierce: Players Need to Make Stand, YAHOO (Nov. 20, 2011), 
http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news;_ylt=AnqURQ15UKkkyBGD_cg03fG8vLYF?slug=mc-
spears_paul_pierce_celtics_nba_lockout_111911. 
 200. See id. 
 201. Id. (quoting Pierce). 
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response to the negative emotions they felt about the complicated clash they 
experienced over the past fifty years. 
IV. Alternative, Complementary Explanations 
The foregoing explanations for why the players ended up with such 
unfavorable terms in the 2011 Agreement are dominant in the public 
narrative regarding the lockout and its fallout.  However, there are also 
alternative, complementary explanations for the players’ subpar results.  
Research in the fields of labor law, industrial relations, and communications 
helps provide a robust and insightful framework through which to better 
understand the folly of the NBPA.  Specifically, understanding the role of 
union democracy and public support—with a special emphasis on an 
effective media strategy and public relations campaign—helps provide a 
fuller accounting of the results of the lockout and the 2011 Agreement. 
A. Gaining Public Support Through an Effective Public Relations 
Campaign 
1. Context and Examples 
Industrial relations scholarship provides key insight as to the importance 
of public support and an effective public relations campaign during 
collective bargaining and, in particular, during a lockout or strike.  Both 
union leaders and management know that swaying public opinion in their 
favor oftentimes leads to leverage at the bargaining table.202  Public support 
may, in fact, be most important during times of labor strife.203  Labor 
                                                                                                                 
 202. See Michael H. LeRoy, Joshua L. Schwarz & Karen S. Koziara, The Law and 
Economics of Collective Bargaining for Hospitals: An Empirical Public Policy Analysis of 
Bargaining Unit Determinations, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 4 n.6 (1992) (noting how unions 
prioritize public support when preparing for a strike, including providing union members 
with strike manuals that have instructions as to how to win over the public).   
 203. See GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAW 526 (4th ed. 2010). See generally 
AMIE E. BERGIN, WHAT EFFECTS DO PUBLIC RELATIONS ACTIONS HAVE ON LABOR DISPUTES? 
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disputes are “[public relations] battle[s] that require the skills of the most 
savvy communicators,”204 and “[a]ny union in today’s society that doesn’t 
have good communication with its members and the public will not 
survive.”205  The stakes may be even higher for unions as they enter 
collective bargaining negotiations because they tend to start at a 
disadvantage from a public support standpoint, as the general public tends 
to have a negative view of unions.206  This public support deficit stems from 
a gradual decline in union membership over the past forty years and the 
media coverage of unions that has tended to involve stories of corruption, 
crime, greed, and violent strikes.207 
Given the importance of public support, management and labor focus 
more intently on crafting and executing an effective public relations 
strategy, though each side often takes a slightly different approach.  
Management generally tends to stay positive—in an attempt to expand on 
its built-in advantage with the public’s negative sentiment toward unions—
while unions oftentimes go negative by painting management in an 
unsympathetic light.208  Unions rely progressively more on public relations 
campaigns, or “corporate campaigns,” to put pressure on employers 
because the traditional leverage unions had (the strike) is no longer as 
effective as it once was.209  The relative ineffectiveness of strikes has been 
due to a decline in union membership, the possibility of losing more public 
support through a strike, and the looming threat of replacement workers.210   
Accordingly, unions devise public relations campaigns to pressure the 
employers’ stakeholders—such as its customers, investors, board of 
directors, lenders, and suppliers—who, in turn, will sway the employers to 
                                                                                                                 
several messages to the union through the media; the employer told the media that it was 
prepared for a long strike and that a strike would result in a contract that was less favorable 
to workers; and the employer used the media to leak some details from its “final” offer to the 
union). 
 204. In Labor Strike Situations, supra note 203. 
 205. WILLIAM J. PUETTE, THROUGH JAUNDICED EYES: HOW THE MEDIA VIEW ORGANIZED 
LABOR 143 (1992) (quoting a communications director for the United Steelworkers union). 
 206. BERGIN, supra note 203, at 2. 
 207. See PAUL F. CLARK, BUILDING MORE EFFECTIVE UNIONS 127-28 (2000) (discussing 
a Gallup poll showing that only 26% of the public had confidence in unions as an 
institution); Diane E. Schmidt, Public Opinion and Media Coverage of Labor Unions, 14 J. 
OF LAB. RES. 151, 152-53 (1993) (citing to Gallup polls taken from 1947 to 1985). 
 208. See In Labor Strike Situations, supra note 203.  
 209. BERGIN, supra note 203, at 2. 
 210. See Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and the Transformation of American Labor Unions, 
69 MO. L. REV. 365, 374-75 (2004). 
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reach agreement with the unions.211  These corporate campaigns attempt to 
seize the public’s attention and generate sympathy for the union workers 
through strategies such as “litigation, regulatory complaints, political 
appeals, advertisements, press conferences, rallies, and even street 
theater.”212  Unions also form coalitions with civil rights groups, 
community organizations, and religious leaders to help increase pressure on 
the employers’ stakeholders.213  If successful, such corporate campaigns can 
become more than just an employer-employee matter, rising to a 
community, regional, state, or even national issue.214  The broader the 
media and public attention—assuming it is positive to the workers’ 
position—the greater the leverage the union will have in its collective 
bargaining negotiations and labor dispute. 
Management, on the other hand, usually approaches this negative 
publicity in one of two ways.  First, the employer may respond by adversely 
portraying the union.215  Management might imply that the striking workers 
are greedy and release supporting information showing that the workers are 
highly paid within the region for that type of work.216  In addition, the 
employer may attempt to portray the union members as outsiders or 
troublemakers—“those people.”217  Second, management may choose not to 
go negative but instead release factual information that counters the union’s 
corporate campaign attacks.218 
Two union public relations campaigns stand out as particularly effective 
and demonstrate what is needed to win over public support and use it 
advantageously in collective bargaining negotiations.  The first is the 
Justice for Janitors campaign from 1990 to 2000 in Los Angeles.219  The 
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Justice for Janitors campaign garnered much media attention and gained 
significant public support through peaceful and orderly protests and rallies 
strategically located outside of the buildings that the janitors cleaned.220  
The campaign was successful because the janitors’ union—the Service 
Employees International Union (SEIU)—was well-prepared and planned 
for the campaign far in advance.  Even a year before the first strike, SEIU 
carefully constructed a persuasive public relations strategy by conducting 
polls and focus groups.221  The union also considered the greater political 
and economic context of the labor dispute.  For example, despite the 
economic growth enjoyed by the Los Angeles region—particularly in and 
around the time of the campaign—there was still a tremendous economic 
gap between the affluent and the poor in the area.222  SEIU saw the 
opportunity to make the janitors symbols of this economic inequality: low-
wage, immigrant laborers who worked nights to clean the upscale buildings 
of the wealthy elite’s daytime offices.223  At the same time that SEIU waged 
the Justice for Janitors campaign, California passed an anti-undocumented 
immigrant initiative—Proposition 187—which generated a great deal of 
sympathy for low-wage, immigrant workers.224   
The Justice for Janitors’ media campaign message of seeking justice for 
the working poor resonated with the public in Los Angeles’s economic and 
political climate.225  The media’s extensive coverage of the campaign was 
                                                                                                                 
U.S. labour movement in the late twentieth century”).  The Justice for Janitors campaign 
eventually spread to other cities as well.  Id. 
 220. Michael M. Oswalt, Note, The Grand Bargain: Revitalizing Labor Through NLRA 
Reform and Radical Workplace Relations, 57 DUKE L.J. 691, 708 (2007). 
 221. Erickson et al., supra note 219, at 553. 
 222. See id. at 562-63.  During this time, Californians also adopted Proposition 210, 
which raised the minimum wage in the state, and many cities passed living wage ordinances.  
Id.  For more background on local living wage ordinances, see David Neumark, Living 
Wages: Protection for or Protection from Low-Wage Workers?, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 
27, 28-29 (2004) (detailing various living wage laws in the United States). 
 223. See Erickson et al., supra note 219, at 553.  
 224. Id. at 562. 
 225. See id. (noting that “[m]uch of the union’s negotiating leverage came from the 
strong public sentiment supporting the janitors’ efforts, not from preventing buildings from 
being cleaned”).  For more information regarding the importance of the political context of 
union efforts, see Preston Rudy, “Justice for Janitors,” Not “Compensation for 
Custodians”: The Political Context and Organizing in San Jose and Sacramento, in 
REBUILDING LABOR: ORGANIZING AND ORGANIZERS IN THE NEW UNION MOVEMENT 133, 134 
(Ruth Milkman & Kim Voss eds., 2004) (arguing that the Justice for Janitors’ union 
organizing campaigns in San Jose and Sacramento demonstrated that unions’ ability to 
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sympathetic to the union and its members, as was public sentiment.226  In 
response to this public support, elected officials from both political parties 
and community leaders expressed support for the janitors and even 
intervened in the dispute.227  This intense public scrutiny led the employers 
to resolve the strike with terms that were highly favorable to the janitors.228 
The second noteworthy union public relations campaign was the 
Teamsters-UPS strike in 1997.  Similar to the Justice for Janitors campaign, 
the Teamsters union prepared more than a year in advance for the strike.229  
The union surveyed its members and discovered that its membership was 
concerned about the lack of full-time positions available to them.230  In 
response, the Teamsters leadership designed a message to appeal to its 
members and the public more generally.231  The union condemned UPS’s 
employment of a substantial (and growing) number of part-time workers 
and used effective slogans, such as “Part-time America won’t work”232 and 
“People don’t have part-time children or part-time mortgages,”233 to 
communicate their message.  These slogans caught the public’s attention 
because the economic recession in the early 1990s had left the general 
public with a negative view of big business and hostility toward the rapidly 
increasing incidence of part-time (rather than full-time) jobs.234  The public 
feared corporate downsizing and worried that there would be a continued 
loss of full-time jobs—with wages and benefits to support a family—and a 
rise, instead, of part-time, low-wage jobs with no benefits.235  The public 
was particularly hostile to this trend because it coincided with a rise in 
corporate profits and a once-again robust economy.236   
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The Teamsters publicized their message through rallies, press releases, 
and other events aimed at gaining news coverage.237  The union also 
prepared its members to communicate effectively with their customers 
regarding the union’s position.238  Indeed, the UPS drivers—themselves 
union members—had face-to-face interactions with customers during 
deliveries, and these communications helped contribute to the strong public 
support that the Teamsters were able to garner during the strike.239  The 
public support was particularly impressive—polling showed 55% supported 
the union compared to 27% supporting UPS—given that the public suffered 
some inconvenience in disruptions in service by the nation’s largest 
shipping company.240  With such strong public backing, the union was able 
to pressure UPS to reach a favorable settlement a mere fifteen days after 
beginning the strike.241 
As these two examples demonstrate, effective public relations campaigns 
can help unions gain leverage over management and secure a more 
desirable outcome for their members.  Indeed, these corporate campaigns 
have been valuable even for unions that have not enjoyed the same kind of 
national media attention as the Justice for Janitors and Teamsters 
campaigns.242  Such success stories demonstrate that preparation is key to 
the union efforts.  In the two examples above, the unions thoroughly 
researched the employers and the related industries.  They also crafted their 
public relations messaging in light of the political and economic climate at 
the time.  Each union’s leadership then educated their respective members 
about the employer, the industry, the union’s positions, and the methods 
and messages for dealing with the media and the public.  The unions next 
used various strategies—such as face-to-face contacts, rallies, protests, 
press conferences, and other events aimed at attracting news coverage—for 
disseminating their message.  In doing so, the unions developed and 
effectively communicated messages that resonated with their members and 
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with the public at large.  This public support, in turn, helped these unions 
secure favorable terms in their new contracts with their employers. 
2. The NBPA Public Relations Debacle 
In most respects, the need for a players’ union—like the NBPA—to 
properly prepare and execute an effective public relations campaign during 
labor strife is no different than that of other unions.  Despite the popularity 
of professional athletes and the ease with which they can access media 
outlets,243 the public generally is as unsympathetic to professional athletes 
during labor disputes as it often is with the union position in other 
industries.244  The public commonly views work stoppages in professional 
sports—whether due to strike or lockout—as related to the greed of both 
sides (with particular disdain for the players) and thus reacts with 
resentment and disgust.245  In particular, the resentment towards the players 
may be even more acute when the media portrays them as privileged 
individuals who make their living playing a sport—in contrast to the 
owners, who are seen as businesspersons.246  Given this context, it is critical 
for players’ unions like the NBPA to craft a message that will resonate with 
the general public. 
The NBA players faced a predictable deficit in public support when the 
lockout began.  The public had trouble relating to millionaire young men—
most of whom were in their twenties—and thus felt little sympathy for 
them.247  It certainly did not help that the players—and, more specifically, 
their salaries—were known (or easily ascertainable) by the public.  In 
contrast, the owners were faceless and their incomes largely unknown.248  
                                                                                                                 
 243. See DAVID F. PRINDLE, THE POLITICS OF GLAMOUR: IDEOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY IN 
THE SCREEN ACTORS GUILD 3 (1988). 
 244. See Michelle Hertz, Note, The National Basketball Association and the National 
Basketball Players Association Opt to Cap Off the 1988 Collective Bargaining Agreement 
with a Full Court Press: In re Chris Dudley, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 251, 272 n.145 (1995) 
(explaining that the public had no sympathy for the NFL, MLB, NHL, or the respective 
players’ union in their various bargaining disputes during the mid-1990s). 
 245. Id. 
 246. See, e.g., Aaron Shepard, Comment, Football’s Stormy Future: Forecasting the 
Upcoming National Football League Labor Negotiations, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 527, 531 
(2010) (discussing NFL players in particular). 
 247. See Kurt Helin, Love Says Players Want Compromise but Will Not Roll Over, 
NBCSPORTS (Aug. 17, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/08/17/love-says-
players-want-compromise-but-will-not-roll-over/. 
 248. See Kurt Helin, Stern Goes on the Offensive During Media Tour, NBCSPORTS (Oct. 
14, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/14/david-stern-goes-on-the-
offensive-during-media-tour/ [hereinafter Helin, Stern Goes on the Offensive]. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss1/1
2014]        LESSONS FROM THE NBA LOCKOUT 41 
 
 
This dynamic helps explain, in part, why the public seemed generally to 
resent the millionaire players more than the billionaire owners.249  Part of 
this public resentment grew from the debate surrounding nonguaranteed 
contracts.  In particular, there was a focus in the media coverage on the 
“malingering player”—those players who signed lucrative, long-term 
guaranteed contracts and then either underperformed or missed many 
games due to injury.250  Commissioner Stern certainly fueled this perception 
in his public relations strategy, as it tended to reinforce the public’s already 
negative perceptions of the players.251   
Some players and commentators pushed back against this 
characterization of the players.  NBPA President Derek Fisher argued that 
while a few players were overpaid, others (like 2010-11 NBA MVP Derrick 
Rose) were actually paid below their market value.252  Others argued that it 
made little sense to blame the players for signing and continuing to collect 
on contracts to which general managers and owners agreed.253  Relatedly, 
some commentators pointed out that the “bad” contracts had no actual 
effect on the league’s finances because under the 2005 Agreement, the 
players received 57% of BRI—so the amount of money paid to the players 
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each year would be the same whether such “bad” contracts were made or 
not.254   
The owners, on the other hand, approached this matter differently.  The 
owners downplayed their poor management decisions—in agreeing to these 
“bad” contracts for malingering players—and, instead, advanced public 
rhetoric stereotyping the overpaid, underperforming player.255  As a result, 
the players’ fight was futile.  Even in these instances where the players had 
good facts or arguments on their side, a combination of the public’s 
tendency to demonize the players and the ineffectiveness (and perhaps 
ineptitude) of the NBPA’s public relations campaign strategy spelled doom 
for the union in the court of public opinion. 
Indeed, the NBA (the owners) clearly outmaneuvered the NBPA in the 
public relations battle and the realm of public opinion.  The NBA, in a 
savvy move, set up a Twitter account—@NBA_Labor—in order to 
communicate directly with fans during the lockout.256  But perhaps more 
importantly, the NBA spoke almost exclusively with one voice—that of 
Commissioner Stern—and with very consistent messaging.257  Stern was 
constantly spinning the story of the lockout to the players’ disadvantage.258  
He blamed the players for causing the lockout—despite the lockout being 
the owners’ decision—and portrayed the NBA as an enterprise struggling 
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economically.259  Stern also faulted the players for the parties’ inability to 
reach an agreement and end the lockout, claiming that the players were not 
serious about negotiations.260  His arguments and messaging were so 
effective in public perception that one commentator stated that Stern 
“cherry pick[ed] facts. . . in a way that [made him sound] more reasonable 
than the owners actually [were].”261 
As the lockout wore on, Stern continued to portray the players as 
unreasonable and pointed to “concessions” that the owners were making in 
an attempt to make a deal and end the lockout.262  He pointed to such 
concessions as retaining guaranteed contracts for players and abandoning 
the hard salary cap.263  Seen through another lens, however, the owners had 
not actually conceded anything because a hard salary cap and 
nonguaranteed contracts were not included in the 2005 Agreement nor had 
they been a part of any agreement between the two sides during the 
negotiations for the 2011 Agreement.264  Nevertheless, Stern’s message 
seemed to resonate with the public.  This may be due, in part, to the fact 
that the union took a rather civil tone in their public relations campaign and 
did a poor job of educating, or generating sympathy from, the public.265  
Moreover, the NBPA’s general professional restraint seemed to be too 
weak a response to Stern’s “all-out offensive.”266  Even some players could 
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not help but acknowledge how effective Stern was: Dwayne Wade 
described Stern’s public relations efforts as “amazing” and stated that “the 
NBA has done . . . a great job complaining.  We haven’t done a great job of 
that so no one sees our side.”267 
While there may be some truth to Wade’s statement, the public relations 
gaffes of several individual players also hurt the NBPA’s overall media 
strategy.268  The union attempted to avoid such problems within the fifty-
six-page instructional “Lockout Handbook” that featured public relations 
guidelines and talking points, with a reminder to “[p]lease be sensitive 
about interviews or other media displays of a luxurious lifestyle.”269  
Nevertheless, comments like that from Rajon Rondo that he was having the 
“best summer of [his] life”270 made it difficult for out-of-work fans—many 
of whom were still struggling from the effects of the Great Recession—to 
relate to, and sympathize with, the players.  Steve Nash also made an 
unwise statement when he analyzed the lockout by saying, “You have two 
wealthy sides arguing over percentage points . . . both sides are arguing for 
inevitably selfish reasons.”271  While Nash’s comment may have been an 
honest—and perhaps accurate—assessment of the lockout, it only seemed 
to add to the public perception that the players were petty. 
More importantly, the players’ efforts to counter and correct 
Commissioner Stern’s public relations offensive were ineffective.  The 
union attempted to reframe the public debate by claiming they merely 
wanted a fair deal.272  The players even launched a “Let Us Play” public 
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relations campaign on Twitter in the hopes of turning the public’s negative 
sentiment against the owners by blaming the league for the games that had 
been canceled up until that point (the preseason games).273  On October 10, 
2011, more than one hundred players either tweeted “LET US PLAY 
#StandUnited” or other similar messages.274  The next day, Stern canceled 
the first two weeks of the regular season, and the players again responded 
on Twitter.275  In their tweets, many players blamed the owners for the 
canceled games, thanked the fans for their support, apologized to arena 
employees who were out of work because of the lockout, and accused Stern 
of disseminating propaganda and misinformation.276   
Interestingly, despite this concerted and deliberate effort, the “Let Us 
Play” campaign did little to increase public sympathy for the players.277  
The NBPA—unlike the SEIU and the Teamsters—had not properly 
considered the economic climate of 2011.  Members of the public, many of 
whom were struggling to pay their bills in the aftermath of the Great 
Recession, found the players’ argument that they “just wanted to play” 
entirely unpersuasive.278  If the players had merely wanted to play, they 
could have simply accepted the owners’ most recent offer—an offer that 
still would have afforded the players income greater than 99% of 
Americans.279  Indeed, it was apparent to most observers that the players 
wanted to do more than play; they also sought to advance their financial 
interests—and tried to do so by garnering public support through the public 
relations campaign.280  The “Let Us Play” campaign thus came off as 
disingenuous and proved counterproductive by alienating the public further 
from the players.281 
                                                                                                                 
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/912706-nba-lockout-anthony-tolliver-talks-to-br-about-
potential-end-to-the-lockout (quoting Anthony Tolliver as saying the same).   
 273. Kurt Helin, NBA Players Launch “Let Us Play” Twitter Campaign, NBCSPORTS 
(Oct. 10, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/10/nba-players-launch-“let-
us-play”-twitter-campaign/. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Chris Richardson, NBA Cancels Regular Season Games, NBA Players React on 
Twitter, WEBPRONEWS (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.webpronews.com/nba-cancels-regular-
season-games-nba-players-react-on-twitter-2011-10. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Kurt Helin, Players Union to Host Meeting in Los Angeles Friday, NBCSPORTS 
(Oct. 11, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/11/players-union-to-host-
meeting-in-los-angeles-friday/. 
 278. Id. 
 279. See id. 
 280. See id. 
 281. See id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
46 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1 
 
 
Later in the lockout, Etan Thomas, the NBPA Executive First Vice 
President, borrowed rhetoric from the Occupy Wall Street protestors in an 
editorial in which he claimed that the owners were greedy and that the 
players did not want to be exploited.282  Thomas characterized the owners 
as the top one percent, thus implicitly associating the players with the 
middle and lower classes (the 99%).283  He also suggested that the owners 
wanted a bailout—to use another emotionally charged term from the Great 
Recession—for their own financial mismanagement of their respective 
franchises.284  This exploitation theme and analogy to the Occupy Wall 
Street movement bordered on the ridiculous, given that the NBA players’ 
incomes squarely placed them in the top one percent of wage earners in 
America, and did nothing to increase public sympathy and support.285  In 
fact, it may well have turned off more members of the public to the union’s 
positions.  This may explain why, even when several commentators began 
to side with the players in the lockout dispute, the players’ public relations 
efforts still seemed to have little impact on the public.286  Based on 
comments like Thomas’s and the apparent disingenuousness of the “Let Us 
Play” campaign, the players—with their extravagant salaries—came off as 
unsympathetic protagonists.287   
In sum, the NBPA’s public relations campaign was flawed for a variety 
of reasons.  Unlike the SEIU and the Teamsters,288 the NBPA was not well-
prepared for the lockout and their media strategy was ill-conceived and 
poorly executed.  While the union leadership attempted to educate members 
about their public relations approach, players failed to promote a uniform 
message and said—or tweeted—questionable things that reinforced existing 
negative public perceptions of the players.  Moreover, even when the 
players were on message, their public relations themes seemed oblivious to 
the economic climate.  In this regard, even when the players had good 
arguments or facts on their side, their messages did not resonate with the 
public.  The players’ public relations efforts were ultimately ineffective and 
thus did not give the union the leverage it sought in its collective bargaining 
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negotiations.  In fact, the union’s campaign may have ultimately hurt them 
in the public eye—thus giving the owners even greater leverage—
explaining, in part, why the players wound up agreeing to such unfavorable 
terms in the 2011 Agreement. 
B. Union Democracy 
1. The Importance of Member Communication and Engagement 
For a union there may be no factor more important in collective 
bargaining negotiations than mobilizing its rank-and-file members in a 
contract campaign.  Indeed, a union is most formidable when its members 
are engaged in the collective bargaining process and united in their support 
of the union’s platform and strategy.  This reality highlights the importance 
of union democracy, a theory in industrial relations scholarship that refers 
to a type of union governance that prioritizes member preferences and gives 
members considerable influence regarding the direction of the union.289  To 
this end, union democracy envisions union members as having, at a 
minimum, information regarding the work of the union, the ability to 
communicate their views to other union members and leadership without 
fear of retaliation, and free elections for the union.290  Unions are, 
somewhat by definition, single-party bureaucracies,291 so the efficacy of 
union democracy can best be judged by the union’s responsiveness to its 
members’ views.292  Since democratic processes within a union do not 
necessarily ensure or beget union democracy, one must look to see 
“whether those [democratic] processes provide the substance of meaningful 
participation and fairness.”293 
Union democracy is particularly important because labor laws are 
structured in a way to both support, but also potentially hinder, union 
member participation.  For example, Congress enacted the Labor-
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Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA)294—also 
referred to as the Landrum-Griffin Act—to address the corruption and labor 
racketeering that had infected many unions up until that point.295  The 
purpose of the Act was to “protect union members from oppressive union 
leadership while preserving the union’s right to adopt reasonable rules of 
governance.”296  In short, LMRDA sought to strengthen union 
democracy.297  On the other hand, the principle of exclusive representation 
in labor law—which affords a union the ability to be the sole negotiator in 
the collective bargaining context for all workers in a particular industry298—
seems to de-emphasize members’ power vis-à-vis union leadership and may 
even depress member participation.299  Exclusive representation can thus 
preclude member participation in contract disputes and hinder members’ 
ability to hold their union leaders accountable.300   
This seeming tension in labor law helps explain the two dominant forms 
of collective bargaining: democratic and elitist.  Democratic collective 
bargaining occurs when unions ensure that their members have a “direct 
and effective voice in the negotiation and ratification of the collective 
[bargaining] agreement.”301  In this regard, the democratic model values and 
promotes union member participation despite the utilitarian arguments 
against this type of participation.302  Moreover, democratic collective 
bargaining provides an incentive for the union leadership to be honest with 
its members, to communicate with (and persuade) its members regarding 
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what it believes to be attainable demands, and to provide opportunities for 
member participation—even by dissenters—to help build unity within the 
union.303   
Elitist collective bargaining, on the other hand, consolidates union power 
in its leadership—which speaks on behalf of the entire union.304  This 
model thus has a small group of union leaders that “articulates demands, 
forms the bargaining priorities, negotiates with the employer, and concludes 
a binding agreement.”305  With this approach, union leaders may seek to 
resolve the collective bargaining negotiations with the employer by any 
means necessary: lying to members about the contents of a proposed 
contract, not pursuing particular demands or simply not putting them in 
writing, or even making payoffs to particularly influential union 
members.306  This is not to say that elitist collective bargaining necessarily 
precludes all democratic procedures.  Indeed, even in this model, union 
leadership may poll its members when initially forming demands or trying 
to get “expressions of public support” from them.307  However, elitist 
collective bargaining treats union democracy as a means to an end rather 
than a goal in itself.308  Therefore, the model of collective bargaining that a 
union employs—elitist versus democratic—will have implications for the 
resolution of intra-union conflicts and the collective bargaining process 
more generally. 
While there is not much empirical research on the effects of union 
democracy, two studies provide some insight into how it influences union 
campaigns.309  The authors of these studies started with the hypothesis that 
a greater degree of union democracy would lead to more congruence 
between the objectives of union leaders, on the one hand, and union 
members on the other.310  In other words, the union’s bargaining demands 
                                                                                                                 
 303. Id. at 840. 
 304. Id. at 795. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. at 840. 
 307. Id. at 795. 
 308. See id.  
 309. Cheryl L. Maranto & Jack Fiorito, The Effect of Union Characteristics on the 
Outcome of NLRB Certification Elections, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 225 (1987); Jack 
Fiorito & Wallace E. Hendricks, Union Characteristics and Bargaining Outcomes, 40 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 569 (1987). 
 310. Fiorito & Hendricks, supra note 309, at 572; Maranto & Fiorito, supra note 309, at 
227. 
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would better reflect member preferences.311  Both studies found this 
hypothesis to be true.312  Interestingly, one of the studies found that a 
greater degree of union democracy improved non-wage outcomes, but 
reduced wages when compared to unions with less democracy.313  The 
authors noted that their finding was consistent with an industrial relations 
theory that union leaders tend to overestimate member interest in wage over 
non-wage issues.314  The authors thus concluded that greater union 
democracy influences bargaining outcomes—but more in terms of the 
“shape,” as opposed to the “size,” of the outcomes.315  
Despite this study showing that union democracy led to more tailored 
non-wage outcomes—rather than simply “more” outcomes (as is usually 
associated with wages)—proponents of union democracy continue to 
contend that more democratic unions are more effective at collective 
bargaining than unions that follow the elitist approach.316  Indeed, the 
Teamsters-UPS strike can be considered a paradigm of union democracy: 
an engaged, unified rank-and-file membership helping reap significant 
benefits in the collective bargaining process.317  However, other scholars 
have expressed reservations about union democracy, arguing that it gives 
union members too much power.318  Such power, they posit, results in more 
democratic unions pursuing the rank-and-file objectives—which tend to be 
motivated by short-term, selfish interests—at the expense of the union’s 
long-term interests.319  Moreover, some scholars argue that the general 
                                                                                                                 
 311. See Fiorito & Hendricks, supra note 309, at 572; Maranto & Fiorito, supra note 309, 
at 227. 
 312. Fiorito & Hendricks, supra note 309, at 582; Maranto & Fiorito, supra note 309, at 
238 (concluding that more democratic unions were more likely to win certification 
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 313. Fiorito & Hendricks, supra note 309, at 580. 
 314. See id. 
 315. Id. at 582. 
 316. See, e.g., Robert Bruno, Democratic Goods: Teamster Reform and Collective 
Bargaining Outcomes, 21 J. OF LAB. RES. 83, 84 (2000) (arguing that “when unions institute 
democratic decision-making procedures and practices, they elicit valuable membership input 
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interest”); Michael J. Goldberg, In the Cause of Union Democracy, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
759, 763 (2008). 
 317. See Bruno, supra note 316, at 84. 
 318. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Straw Men of Union Leadership, 80 YALE L.J. 687, 
692 (1971) (reviewing DEREK C. BOK & JOHN T. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN 
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union membership tends to be more aggressive, less reasonable, and less 
willing to compromise than union leadership.320  They likewise argue that 
union members—emboldened through union democracy—will make 
“uninformed, unintelligent emotional choice[s].”321  These scholars find 
democratic collective bargaining inefficient322 and prefer an elitist 
collective bargaining model with union leaders that are “imaginative, 
efficient, . . . effective,”323 “enlightened,” and “responsible”—
characteristics that are euphemisms for leaders who are not beholden to 
rank-and-file union membership and are able to take unpopular stances.324 
Unsurprisingly, advocates for union democracy claim that unions can 
effectively advocate for member preferences without sacrificing efficiency, 
bargaining strategy, or long-term union objectives.325  Such proponents 
argue against union leadership insulating itself from the rank-and-file union 
membership.326  Instead, they believe that union leadership can strike a 
balance between, on the one hand, soliciting members’ views to help 
inform union policy and strategy and, on the other hand, setting forth a 
vision for the union and persuading the members to support policies—even 
unpopular ones—that benefit the union in the long-term.327  Indeed, it 
                                                                                                                 
insuperable obstacle[]” to achieving more efficient, effective leadership and long-range 
planning). 
 320. See, e.g., Lucio Baccaro, Centralized Collective Bargaining and the Problem of 
“Compliance”: Lessons from the Italian Experience, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 579, 596 
(2000) (challenging the idea that “centralized collective bargaining and workers’ direct 
control over union policy are basically incompatible” and the assumption that workers are 
more extreme and aggressive than union leaders); Hyde, supra note 302, at 849, 850-51 
(discussing the assumption that “national union leaders, insulated from rank-and-file 
pressure, are more ‘reasonable’ than local leaders or the rank and file itself” and the concern 
that democratic collective bargaining is inefficient and leads to strikes, rather than 
compromise).  But see THOMAS R. COLOSI & ARTHUR ELIOT BERKELEY, COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING: HOW IT WORKS AND WHY 105 (3d ed. 2006) (explaining that union members 
are sometimes less aggressive than the union’s leadership and will accept an offer that the 
union leadership does not support to avoid layoffs or other cutbacks). 
 321. COLOSI & BERKELEY, supra note 320, at 106. 
 322. See Hyde, supra note 302, at 850-51. 
 323. Summers, Straw Men, supra note 318, at 692 (summarizing Bok and Dunlop’s 
position). 
 324. Baccaro, supra note 320, at 596. 
 325. Summers, Straw Men, supra note 318, at 692-93 (“[U]nions . . . can be sensitive to 
protecting democratic rights and maintaining democratic procedures and still strive for long-
term social goals.”). 
 326. Id. 
 327. See CLARK, supra note 207, at 106-08 (stressing the need for effective 
communication between the membership and leadership of unions); MIKE PARKER & 
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renders union leadership essentially pointless if they merely carry out 
members’ instructions, particularly when the leaders tend to be more 
knowledgeable regarding union affairs and devote more of their time to 
contemplating and crafting union strategy.328  Therefore, in order to achieve 
this balance, there must be effective two-way communication between the 
rank-and-file members and union leadership.329  
Indeed, it is hard to overstate the importance of leader-member 
communications within unions.  As one scholar notes, “Union leaders have 
a near monopoly on the channels of communication within the union, they 
have special knowledge and access to information concerning the union and 
its policies, and they have opportunities for extensive contacts with 
members and for asserting leadership.”330  In this regard, to achieve 
effective intra-union communication, union leaders need to take the 
initiative to set forth their vision for the union—informed by membership 
deliberation and input—and persuade members to support those policies.331  
Success will be dictated, in large part, by members’ commitment to the 
proposed plan.332  In fact, a union achieves its greatest power and influence 
in collective bargaining negotiations when its members are supportive and 
engaged.333  Therefore, union leaders should encourage discussion, hear 
opposition, and educate members in order to refine and improve a plan 
while gaining member support for it in the process.334  Accordingly, 
effective union democracy necessitates an internal union campaign before 
proceeding with an external campaign in the context of collective 
bargaining negotiations.335 
                                                                                                                 
MARTHA GRUELLE, DEMOCRACY IS POWER: REBUILDING UNIONS FROM THE BOTTOM UP 46-
49 (1999).  Union leaders can educate their members about the union’s long-term interests 
and convince them to support policies that, while unpopular, advance these interests.  
Summers, Straw Men, supra note 318, at 693. 
 328. PARKER & GRUELLE, supra note 327, at 48. 
 329. See CLARK, supra note 207, at 106-08. 
 330. Summers, Straw Men, supra note 318, at 693. 
 331. CLARK, supra note 207, at 106. 
 332. See PARKER & GRUELLE, supra note 327, at 48. 
 333. See Ann C. Hodges, Avoiding Legal Seduction: Reinvigorating the Labor Movement 
to Balance Corporate Power, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 889, 903 (2011) (stating “[w]hen workers 
are disconnected, their interest and participation wanes and any campaign for change loses 
power” and “[i]f the union is unable to mobilize its members to support collective action in 
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Two-way communication is critical for gaining rank-and-file member 
support, for one-way persuasion alone will be insufficient to secure such 
support.336  Union members will feel insulted and disengaged if their 
preferences have not been discussed and incorporated beforehand into the 
union’s policies.337  Even unions that follow elitist collective bargaining 
usually cultivate some rank-and-file member involvement at the start of a 
negotiation campaign.338  In fact, leaders in highly bureaucratic unions are 
still unlikely to ignore membership preferences as they are motivated by a 
desire to retain their leadership positions and avoid membership loss.339  
Indeed, union leadership needs the support of its members during contract 
negotiations in order to draw significant crowds for rallies and pickets and 
to carry on the campaign within the workplace.340  To this end, many unions 
distribute surveys before a campaign to ascertain member preferences and 
build a platform based, at least in part, on their priorities.341   
However, an initial survey alone is usually insufficient, as members’ 
views are not static and may change over the course of the collective 
bargaining negotiations.342  Union leadership must continue to receive 
feedback from its members throughout the negotiation process.343  Such 
comprehensive, ongoing communications between union leaders and 
members should include “discussions at meetings, letters and columns in 
newspapers, open-door policies at union offices, e-mail and message 
centers, meetings with intermediate-level leaders, workplace walk-arounds, 
‘working’ leadership, and social activities.”344  Moreover, effective two-
way communication also requires union leaders to provide members with 
up-to-date, accurate, and complete information using websites, emails, and 
various forms of social media to communicate about dynamic events that 
occur within the negotiation process.345   
                                                                                                                 
 336. Id. at 52. 
 337. See id. at 48-49. 
 338. Summers, Democracy in a One-Party State, supra note 292, at 105-06. 
 339. See id. 
 340. PARKER & GRUELLE, supra note 327, at 52. 
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When such intra-union deliberation and discourse precedes and 
continues throughout collective bargaining negotiations, the likelihood that 
leadership and member interests will align increases.346  In fact, such a 
process can lead to greater membership support—so much so that if union 
leadership reaches an impasse with management in its negotiations, union 
members are more likely to support whatever action the union decides to 
take.347  However, if union leaders fail to engage their members in robust 
two-way communication, factions within the union are more likely to form 
and thus weaken the union’s bargaining position.348  While some internal 
conflict is inevitable regardless of the level of leader-member 
communication, more democratic unions enjoy a higher likelihood to 
resolve conflicts internally and thus present a unified front externally in 
their collective bargaining negotiations.349  Moreover, without effective 
intra-union communication, union leadership may pursue an agenda that 
runs contrary to the interests of the rank-and-file members.350  In such 
circumstances, union leaders run the risk that union members will resort to 
self-help measures, such as “secondary associations,” in order to correct the 
direction of the union.351  The potential threat of self-help remedies for 
union members should provide an incentive for union leaders to maintain 
open, two-way channels of communication in order to avoid the disruption 
that oftentimes proves fatal for the union’s bargaining position.352 
Union democracy and intra-union communication appear to be essential 
components for an effective collective bargaining negotiation.  An engaged, 
well-informed union membership can help union leadership craft a platform 
that it can then strategically and enthusiastically support.  An ill-informed, 
disengaged membership can lead to an erosion of support for union 
leadership and ultimately a weaker bargaining position within the 
negotiations.  Therefore, it is incumbent on union leadership to not merely 
                                                                                                                 
 346. See COLOSI & BERKELEY, supra note 320, at 91. 
 347. See id. 
 348. Baccaro, supra note 320, at 596. 
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persuade membership of a preordained platform, but to engage them in a 
deliberation process, communicate with members throughout the 
negotiations, and forge a strong relationship with the rank-and-file members 
to strengthen the union’s overall bargaining position with management. 
2. The NBPA’s Catastrophic Intra-Union Blunders 
The importance of union democracy and intra-union communication may 
have been even greater for the NBPA during the 2011 lockout given that 
players’ unions are unique and more complex than unions in other 
industries.  This is due, in part, to the fact that professional athletes have 
disparate skills and earning power, unlike members in most other private-
sector unions.353  Professional sports feature an elite class of athletes whose 
income—both salary from the particular sport and outside monies from 
endorsements and the like—substantially exceeds that of the average 
member of their union.354  Given their celebrity status and the resources to 
attract top legal counsel and representation, these elite athletes can secure 
advantageous contract terms without the help of their union.  This 
phenomenon suggests that players’ unions rose in these industries to protect 
and further the interests of the more marginal player, who benefitted from 
union efforts to raise players’ salaries and benefits.355  However, players’ 
unions remain relevant even to top-tier players, as the union negotiates 
matters such as the salary cap and luxury tax, which are macro-level issues 
that affect both individual players and the functioning of the sport more 
generally.356   
                                                                                                                 
 353. See Feldman, supra note 25, at 847; Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption 
in Professional Sports, 1989 DUKE L.J. 339, 354-55 (stating “[u]nlike industrial employees, 
professional athletes do not possess homogenous skills; a wide range of ability and expertise 
exists among players” and also explaining that a lack of job security and a brief professional 
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sector unions would be those in the entertainment industry.  See PAUL C. WEILER, 
ENTERTAINMENT, MEDIA, AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 827, 829 (2d ed. 
2002) (noting the “huge difference in the market value of superstars . . . and . . . bit players” 
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example, in the early 2000s, Screen Actors Guild members’ salaries ranged from less than 
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$7500.  See id. at 828. 
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ed. 1989). 
 355. See id. 
 356. See WEILER, supra note 353, at 827-29. 
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The effects of a stratified rank-and-file membership in players’ unions on 
the collective bargaining process are clear and manifest themselves in 
several ways.  For example, such income polarization creates a 
distributional inequality within the union between the elite players and the 
average player.357  In this scenario, the average players have access to fewer 
resources than the elite players, who receive a disproportionate amount of 
the industry’s resources.358  On the one hand, such income disparity still 
benefits the average player because the elite players’ celebrity status 
increases the players’ union’s overall bargaining power and thus leads to 
more favorable terms for all members.359  In this regard, income 
polarization within a players’ union involves an “equality-power 
tradeoff.”360  On the other hand, such stratification can pose great risks to 
union solidarity that, in turn, threatens to undermine the union’s bargaining 
position.361  With a heterogeneous membership, the players’ union winds up 
representing various internal constituencies.  Sometimes the union 
advocates for terms that benefit elite players more than average players, and 
vice versa.362  
This division in internal constituent interests causes players’ unions to 
lack the singularity of interest and cohesiveness that other private-sector 
unions enjoy.363  As a result, the players’ union is more likely to find its 
bargaining position compromised due to a lack of solidarity and unity 
within its membership.364  When the interests of union members 
substantially diverge, the intra-union dynamic can devolve into outright 
                                                                                                                 
 357. See STAUDOHAR, supra note 354, at 7; see also WEILER, supra note 353, at 829 
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conflict, particularly with ineffective internal communications.365  
Moreover, given the celebrity culture of professional sports, such internal 
union conflicts inevitably wind up in media reports—further weakening the 
union’s position.366 
This context is a near pinpointed description of what occurred with the 
NBPA during the 2011 lockout.  The players certainly attempted to show 
solidarity at the beginning of the lockout.  Early on, more than fifty players 
demonstrated their unity and resolve by showing up at a negotiation session 
wearing matching T-shirts that read “STAND/2011 NBPA Summer 
Meeting.”367  Many players also made public statements to the effect that 
they would hold out until they received a fair deal.368  However, these initial 
public signs of unity were belied by later events that demonstrated that the 
NBPA was riddled with, and divided by, a difference in interests among the 
players.  Moreover, agents representing the players played a powerful and 
ultimately disruptive role in the negotiations.  Finally, union leadership 
communicated poorly with its members.  All of these factors led to distrust 
and a weakening in the NBPA’s bargaining position. 
a) A Difference in Players’ Interests 
The lockout quickly brought to the forefront the tension and resentment 
among players caused by the differing interests between the elite players 
and the average players, as well as between the veteran players and the less-
established players.  For example, young players doubted whether veteran 
players—who had already earned a majority of their NBA income—would 
                                                                                                                 
 365. See PRINDLE, supra note 244, at 3 (describing this dynamic within analogous 
entertainment industry unions).   
 366. See id. (noting that “any dispute within the guild is likely to wind up not only in the 
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last-lockout/ (citing Antawn Jamison’s comments). 
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look out for the interests of those just beginning their careers in the 
league.369  Given that the average players’ career is four and a half years,370 
the younger players were anxious to settle the lockout and continue 
playing—both to earn money and to further establish themselves in the 
league.371  The fact that many veteran and elite players wanted to hold out 
for a better deal caused great frustration among the younger players.372 
The lockout also caused friction between the different classes of players.  
One narrative that pervaded lockout discourse in the popular media was that 
the NBA’s elite players—who generated a significant (and 
disproportionate) amount of the league’s revenues—were, in fact, 
underpaid given their value to their teams and the league as a whole.373  In 
fact, some players’ agents, as well as some team owners, advocated for a 
salary structure more akin to the NFL: where the elite players earn lucrative 
salaries, while the majority of players earn an amount closer to the league’s 
minimum salary.374  This suggestion infuriated many of the NBPA’s rank-
and-file members, who very much sought to preserve the NBA’s “middle 
class”—that is, those players making between seven and ten million dollars 
per season.375   
These divergent interests in salary structure likely led the NBPA to keep 
many of its superstar players out of the bargaining process to avoid sending 
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 375. Id. 
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inconsistent messages and perhaps exposing an intra-union fracture.376  
Therefore, despite the belief by some players that the involvement of 
superstars such as Kobe Bryant, Dwayne Wade, and Carmelo Anthony 
would help the union in its negotiations—given that their earning power 
and value to the league could give them leverage with the owners—NBPA 
leadership felt the need to exclude them to keep a consistent, unified 
message that attempted to resonate with the rank-and-file members of the 
union.377  These types of intra-union conflicts ultimately undermined the 
union’s bargaining position and allowed Commissioner Stern and the NBA 
owners to use such divisions to their advantage.  
b) The Disruptive Role of Players’ Agents 
Another point of pressure on the union came from a source absent in 
almost every other private-sector union: agents.  Most, if not all, NBA 
players have agents who represent them in contract negotiations, 
endorsement deals, and the like.378  While agents were not directly involved 
in the collective bargaining process—that is, they did not attend 
negotiations between the NBPA and the league—they played an influential 
role in advising their clients throughout the negotiation process.379  A 
couple of months into the lockout, many agents pressed the players they 
represented to advocate for decertification of the NBPA to create leverage 
in the players’ negotiations with the owners.380  NBPA leadership 
recognized the threat posed by the agents’ influence and resisted these 
efforts, claiming that decertification was not ripe in terms of where the 
negotiations stood and that it should come later, if necessary.381  In fact, 
NBPA President Derek Fisher sent a letter to the players on the eve of a 
players’ meeting, assuring them that progress was being made in the 
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negotiations with the league.382  In particular, Fisher specifically addressed 
the agents’ involvement by stating in the letter that none of the agents—
who were supposedly concerned about the state of the collective bargaining 
negotiations—had contacted him about their concerns.383  Fisher was even 
more pointed: he intimated that, unlike the NBPA, these disgruntled agents 
did not have the players’ best interest in mind.384  Fisher closed his letter by 
imploring the players to “stand with me.”385 
Had the players followed their agents’ advice and forced a vote on 
decertification at this point in the negotiations—in September 2011—it 
would have amounted to a vote of no confidence in the NBPA.386  The 
consequence, of course, would have been a near fatal blow to the union in 
its negotiations with the owners, even if the decertification vote had 
failed.387  Nevertheless, while Fisher’s efforts helped stave off a 
decertification vote, the agents’ role in building such a decertification 
movement still undermined the union’s bargaining position because media 
reports let the owners and general public know of this internal discord.388  
Moreover, from that point on, the NBPA leadership found itself battling the 
increasing influence agents had on the players—a problem which continued 
to weaken its bargaining position the more public the internal union strife 
became.  For example, later that month (September), Fisher again 
distributed a letter in advance of another players’ meeting to assure the 
players that the union would not “sell [players] out or sell [them] short.”389  
He also reminded them that while the union represented the players in 
collective bargaining negotiations, no agreement could be completed 
without their vote.390  Both of these messages would seem, on their face, to 
be unnecessary to articulate to union membership.  As described further in 
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the next subsection, Fisher’s need to convey these messages may be an 
indication of the NBPA’s lack of intra-union communication, planning, and 
union democracy.   
But it may also be an indication of just how influential the agents were in 
this process, particularly the longer the lockout lasted and more player 
frustration grew.391  This appeared to be the case even when some agents 
seemed to take extreme—and perhaps unrealistic—positions given the 
realities of the negotiation process.  For example, in October 2011, several 
high-profile agents sent their clients a letter encouraging them not to accept 
any agreement that changed the BRI percentage allocated to the players 
below the 57% threshold in the 2005 Agreement or that included any other 
systemic changes.392  The agents also believed that the owners would 
eventually back off of their stance of a 50-50 split in BRI.393  Again, the 
union found itself on the defensive.  Fisher sent yet another letter to players, 
claiming that the agents’ letter was filled with “misinformation” and 
“unsupported theories.”394 
In these different ways, the NBPA was fighting two wars during the 
2011 NBA lockout: one with the owners and one with the agents.  
Throughout the lockout, the agents took a hard-line stance, from pushing 
for decertification to not wanting to concede any major changes in BRI or 
other important contract terms to the owners.395  This tension between 
agents and the NBPA put players in the awkward situation of being forced 
to doubt either their union or their agents.396  However, as the lockout wore 
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on, the agents were able to gain more player support for their positions.397  
This eventual split in union membership—between the hard-line players 
(who wanted to hold out for a better deal) and those players who were eager 
to settle the labor dispute and begin the 2011-12 season—made it more 
difficult for the NBPA to present a unified front to the media or the owners.  
Such factionalism—spurred on by the agents—ultimately undermined the 
NBPA’s bargaining position and helped contribute to the players settling 
for a weaker set of terms in the 2011 Agreement than many expected. 
c) Distrust of NBPA Leadership and the Botched Decertification 
Approach 
The NBPA never seemed to have unity among its members, even at the 
beginning of the lockout.  For example, within days of when the lockout 
began, Shane Battier asked if NBPA Executive Director Billy Hunter was 
going to take his normal salary during the lockout—alluding to DeMaurice 
Smith, the executive director of the NFL players’ union, who took a salary 
of one dollar during the NFL lockout.398  Battier’s question seemed to 
evince a lack of trust in—or at least a certain amount of hostility or 
resentment towards—Hunter and perhaps union leadership more generally.  
Moreover, despite their players’ public show of support with the 
“STAND/2011” T-shirts at the first negotiating meeting after the lockout 
began, attendance at player meetings was lackluster at best.399  As outside 
pressures increased, players’ lack of engagement and distrust of NBPA 
leadership grew.  
In late October 2011, a rumor surfaced that NBPA President Derek 
Fisher and NBPA Executive Director Billy Hunter were at odds.400  The 
report claimed that Fisher was willing to take a 50-50 split on BRI and end 
                                                                                                                 
 397. See id. 
 398. Kurt Helin, Battier Asks Union President to Take $1 Salary During Lockout, 
NBCSPORTS (June 30, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/06/30/battier-
asks-union-president-to-take-1-salary-during-lockout/.  While never confirmed, reports 
suggest that Billy Hunter continued to draw his normal salary during the lockout.  See 
Report: Bill Hunter Scoffs at Notion of Taking $1 Salary During Lockout, SPORTINGNEWS 
(June 30, 2011), http://www.sportingnews.com/nba/feed/2010-10/nba-labor/story/report-
billy-hunter-scoffs-at-notion-of-taking-1-salary-during-lockout. 
 399. See Helin, NBA Players Wear “Stand” T-Shirts, supra note 367. 
 400. Howard Beck, N.B.A. Talks Resume (Between Union Officials), N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 
2011, at B18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/sports/basketball/nba-talks-
resume-between-union-officials.html. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss1/1
2014]        LESSONS FROM THE NBA LOCKOUT 63 
 
 
the lockout, while Hunter wanted to hold out for more.401  Both denied the 
rift, but many believed that some of the hard-line players leaked the rumor 
to put pressure on NBPA leadership to agree to a percentage below 53% 
BRI for the players.402  While both Fisher and Hunter sent letters to the 
players urging unity,403 the players’ lack of trust in their leaders was 
deepening.  A sports reporter picked up on this increasing dissension among 
the players in an article in which he claimed that Fisher was not 
representing the players’ interests because Fisher hoped to secure a job with 
the league once he retired from playing basketball.404  Fisher strongly 
denied this characterization and, specifically, the existence of any side deals 
with the league.405  A few days later, Fisher took another public blow from 
fellow player Jerry Stackhouse, who said that he did not want Fisher 
negotiating on his behalf.406  Finally, even those players who were not in 
the anti-NBPA leadership or hardliner camp felt distrust towards Hunter as 
he appeared to make unilateral negotiating decisions without the input of 
the players.407 
Commissioner Stern thrived off of this distrust of union leadership and 
used it to his advantage.  At pivotal moments in the negotiations, Stern 
would paint the NBPA leadership as inept and scare the players with threats 
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of even worse deals than the one he was currently proposing.408  Stern did 
this in mid-October when he undermined Hunter’s credibility by hinting 
that Hunter had suggested a 50-50 split in BRI—something many players 
saw as selling them out in their hopes for a 53-47 split in the players’ 
favor—but that Hunter could not convince his union members to agree to 
the deal.409  This strategic move coincided with the intra-union conflict—
regarding whether to accept a deal or continue to hold out for a better 
deal—becoming public.410  Two weeks later, Stern again destabilized the 
rank-and-file players by announcing that the negotiations had broken down 
because the union refused to accept less than 52% BRI.411  Stern threatened 
to cancel games—which would not be made up—and reduce the owners’ 
offer to 47% of BRI for the players if the players did not accept the latest 
offer.412  Despite having not yet missed a paycheck at this point, the 
players’ resolve—and faith in their union—began to crumble.  Media 
reports suggested that many players were willing to agree to a 50-50 BRI 
split.413  This was a critical turning point in the negotiations, as the players 
had previously demanded 54% or 53% of BRI and drawn a line at 52.5% of 
BRI.414 
It was at this point that the hard-line players and agents pursued 
decertification in earnest, without support of union leadership.415  Fifty 
players held a conference call with an antitrust lawyer and agreed that they 
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would pursue decertification if the union made any further concessions—
namely, falling below 52.5% of BRI.416  While some saw the call as an 
attempt to give leverage to the union—with the threat of decertification 
looming417—it nevertheless signaled a lack of unity among players and a 
lack of confidence in NBPA leadership.  Perhaps sensing his opportunity to 
end the lockout on favorable terms for the owners, Stern gave several 
ultimatums to players in early to mid-November in which he offered deals 
with a 51% to 49% band of BRI for the players.418  Stern also claimed that 
if the players did not accept the deal, the owners would lower their offer to 
47% of BRI for the players and either a hard salary cap or a “flex” salary 
cap.419  Stern increased the pressure on union leadership by releasing the 
offer to USA Today420 and posting a memo regarding the offer on 
NBC.com.421  The players—and thus the union—were terribly divided at 
this point.  Roughly half of the players wanted to vote on the owners’ 
offers, while the other half pushed decertification as a move to leverage 
                                                                                                                 
 416. Id. (observing that the hardline players did not want an agreement where teams 
paying the luxury tax could not use sign-and-trade agreements or the mid-level exception). 
But see Matt Moore, Not All 50 Players United in Decertification Effort on Reported 
Conference Calls, NBCSPORTS (Nov. 5, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/ 
2011/11/05/not-all-50-players-united-in-decertification-effort-on-reported-conference-calls/ 
[hereinafter Moore, Not All 50 Players United] (explaining that the players involved in the 
conference call were not unified behind the idea of decertification, which could cost the 
players more than one season, and that decertification was only one of several options 
discussed during the call). 
 417. See Moore, Not All 50 Players United, supra note 416.  
 418. Helin, Stern Gives Players New Ultimatum, supra note 183 (describing Stern’s 
November 10, 2011 offer); Kurt Helin, Choice Before Players: Take Stern’s Offer or 
Decertify, NBCSPORTS (Nov. 6, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/06/ 
choice-before-players-take-stern%E2%80%99s-offer-or-decertify/ (detailing the Stern’s 
November 6, 2011 offer, including “a mini mid-level of about $2 million for teams paying 
the luxury tax, no sign-and-trades for taxpayers, and a $1 repeater tax”). 
 419. Matt Moore, David Stern Sets Ultimatum for Players: Accept Deal by Wednesday or 
Offer Gets Worse, NBCSPORTS (Nov. 6, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/ 
2011/11/06/david-stern-sets-ultimatum-for-players-accept-deal-by-wednesday-or-offer-gets-
worse/ (describing Stern’s ultimatum). 
 420. Helin, Powerpoint Version, supra note 182. 
 421. Kurt Helin, In Latest Attempt to Sway, David Stern Has Memo for Players, 
NBCSPORTS (Nov. 14, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/14/in-latest-
attempt-to-sway-david-stern-has-memo-for-players/ (detailing Stern’s description of the 
offer as having a 50-50 BRI split, expanding market opportunities for mid-level players, 
permitting “unlimited use of the Bird Exception,” allowing sign-and-trade agreements for 
non-taxpaying teams, and permitting “an active free agent market and greater player 
movement”). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
66 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1 
 
 
their negotiations.422  The NBPA leadership avoided a vote on the owners’ 
proposals, confining its discussion only to team representatives and 
executive committee members.423 
Many thought that the union would modify (and then approve) the offer 
and send it back to the owners—bringing the two sides closer to 
resolution.424  However, as described in Part II.C., the NBPA team 
representatives and executive committee members rejected the owners’ 
latest offer and voted to begin the decertification process by sending a 
notice of disclaimer to the NBA.425  While the union leadership thought that 
such a move would appease the hard-line players and agents, it was met 
with shock because the union chose the disclaimer of interest method of 
decertification.426  If the goal of moving toward decertification was to gain 
leverage on the owners, the union’s move was understandably questionable 
because the disclaimer of interest approach proceeds rather quickly—which 
was not necessarily in the players’ best interest.427  By contrast, the players 
could have petitioned for a vote on decertification, which would have 
provided a forty-five day negotiating window and the leverage they were 
seeking.428  Perhaps the union leadership chose the disclaimer of interest 
route worrying that the players would vote against decertification and 
accept the latest owners’ offer—an outcome the NBPA leadership wanted 
to avoid.429  At this point, the media questioned the union’s strategy,430 and 
it became clear that the players did not really understand the ramifications 
of the disclaimer of interest approach compared to a vote on decertification.  
It seemed that the disclaimer of interest decision stemmed from a sense of 
powerlessness—and overt exclusion of the rank-and-file players—rather 
than an informed decision-making process. 
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The union leadership was understandably criticized for excluding its 
general membership from the decision-making process, particularly at a key 
moment like the decertification decision.  Some players complained 
publicly about being excluded from the decertification and disclaimer of 
interest meeting.431  The NBPA leadership defended itself by stating that it 
was the union’s role to decide what proposal, if any, it should present to the 
players, because the leadership was savvier than the general membership in 
identifying a good deal.432  This statement clearly showed that the union 
believed in an elitist form of collective bargaining rather than democratic 
collective bargaining.  However, the union’s explanation still did not fully 
account for the general membership marginalization.  Team representatives 
were theoretically empowered to act on behalf of their teammates, but some 
team representatives failed to discuss the disclaimer of interest matter with 
their teammates before the vote.433  Moreover, some team representatives 
did not even have current phone numbers for the teammates they 
represented.434  In these regards, many in the union’s general membership 
were not afforded an opportunity to give their input at critical moments of 
the negotiation process, nor did they receive information regarding various 
proposals and potential responses. 
d) Poor Intra-Union Communication and a Lack of Union Democracy 
On November 26, 2011—twelve days after the union voted to dissolve—
the owners and players reached the agreement that became the 2011 
Agreement.435  However, from the players’ standpoint, the terms were no 
better than many of the previous proposals, and the players wound up 
conceding on many key terms that shifted significant revenue from the 
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players to the owners.  One compelling explanation for the ineffectiveness 
of the NBPA—and the players’ negotiation efforts more generally—is the 
lack of union democracy within the NBPA and the poor communication 
between union leadership and players.  While the NBPA attempted to give 
its members information regarding the lockout before it even began—
through the “Lockout Handbook”436—there is very little evidence that the 
union communicated effectively with its members.  In fact, the information 
known publicly suggests the opposite.  For example, team representatives 
did not adequately communicate with their teammates during 
negotiations.437  From media accounts, it did not appear as though the union 
organized regular conference calls, provided frequent progress updates, or 
explained current strategy to the players.438  Productive intra-union 
communication is critical for the success of the union, but the NBPA 
seemed so ineffective in its internal communications strategy that most 
players received their information regarding the negotiations through the 
media.439   
One reason for the NBPA’s poor intra-union communication may be its 
embrace of the elitist form of collective bargaining, where the leadership 
speaks on behalf of the entire union with minimal rank-and-file 
involvement.440  However, even in highly bureaucratic unions like the 
NBPA, there is a role for union democracy and member engagement.441  
Nevertheless, the NBPA leadership did not communicate with its members 
nor seek to engage them in any meaningful fashion.  Indeed, the union 
leaders strategically excluded the rank-and-file players at key points in the 
negotiation.442  In this way, the NBPA seemed to embrace the “by any 
means necessary” approach to elitist collective bargaining, alienating and 
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marginalizing many players and ultimately undermining their negotiation 
efforts.443 
What the NBPA may have needed was better union democracy, which 
could have provided more meaningful ways for the players to effectively 
voice their concerns in the negotiations with the owners.  This is not to say 
that the NBPA leadership should have merely carried out the players’ 
instructions, particularly when the union’s leaders were more 
knowledgeable about the contract terms in the various proposals, as well as 
the collective bargaining process in general.  However, the union leadership 
did not engage its membership in a deliberative, communicative process—
either before or during the lockout—to gauge members’ priorities and 
interests, and missed an opportunity to build unity through such a process.  
To be sure, there were some signs of intra-union communication and union 
democracy.  For example, most players seemed to have adopted the mantra 
of wanting a “fair deal,” and the union was able to engage some of the 
players in a public show of support with the “STAND/2011 NBPA Summer 
Meeting” T-shirts.444  Nevertheless, these modest efforts fall short of the 
limited union democracy efforts in which even unions adhering to elitist 
collective bargaining engage.445  
More importantly, the lack of union democracy hurt union leadership 
throughout its negotiations.  While the players used the buzz term “fair 
deal,”446 the union clearly had not facilitated deliberative conversations 
among its membership to build consensus as to what a “fair deal” would 
look like.  The union had not educated the players as to what it might cost 
them to achieve this “fair deal”—like an extended lockout—and the 
sacrifices necessary to achieve it.  Nor had the NBPA leadership 
realistically framed the dispute—and the financial and other concessions 
that would likely need to be made to the owners—to help manage players’ 
expectations and build consensus around a negotiation plan and contract 
terms on which most players could agree.  While not all of the NBPA’s 
actions were publicized, it appeared as though there were not the type of 
ongoing communications between the NBPA leadership and the rank-and-
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file players that mark successful union collective bargaining efforts.447  In 
short, the union leadership failed on a number of fronts: setting forth a 
vision for the union; working with its members to educate them; 
encouraging union members to help inform and shape the process; and 
ultimately leading the players towards coalescing around a unified, single 
objective.   
One could argue that the NBPA leadership was not solely to blame for 
the general membership being uninformed and disengaged.  Indeed, at least 
one commentator has argued that the rank-and-file players should have 
taken more ownership of their role in the collective bargaining 
negotiations.448  He claimed that the players should have demanded more 
communication from the union leadership, taken efforts to better understand 
the terms of the different proposals that the owners and union presented, 
and insisted on demanding a vote on decertification.449  Moreover, player 
meetings were sparsely attended, even though all players were invited.450  
However, one need only look to the quintessential example of the 
decertification vote—where the union leaders explicitly chose not to allow 
players to vote—to see how disengaged and uninformed players were 
throughout the process due to the NBPA leadership’s belief in elitist 
collective bargaining. 
Two-way communication within a union is critical for its success in 
collective bargaining negotiations, yet the NBPA lacked this important 
element.  It is unsurprising, then, that many players felt insulted by, and 
disengaged from, their union, as their preferences were not being heard nor 
were they ever really solicited.  This faulty approach on the part of union 
leadership only exacerbated the problems created by divergent interests in a 
stratified union like the NBPA.  While it is true that division in member 
interests can likely lead to a lack of solidarity within a union like the 
NBPA, the union leadership did nothing to help resolve such internal 
conflicts.451  Moreover, the NBPA’s elitist approach also did not properly 
account for the problematic—yet predictable—role that agents played in the 
process.  By failing to build unity and consensus among the players, the 
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NBPA leadership helped create the opportunity for agents to divide the 
players along lines that reinforced player stratification.  It is no wonder that 
there was such obvious player distrust of, and resentment toward, the 
NBPA leadership. 
The lack of intra-union communication and union democracy ultimately 
spelled doom for the players.  Without effective communications and a 
unified membership, the NBPA was left vulnerable to manipulation by both 
agents and Commissioner Stern.  Indeed, during key points of the 
negotiations, Stern was incredibly effective in using threats and ultimatums 
to further divide the players and force the union into unfavorable bargaining 
positions.  Had the players felt invested and empowered in the collective 
bargaining process, the NBPA would likely have had a better chance at 
unifying the players around a single goal and maintaining a stronger 
bargaining position.  However, in light of the union infighting and divisions 
that occurred due to poor intra-union communication and a lack of union 
democracy, the players lost much of their bargaining power and leverage 
and were forced to agree to such unfavorable terms in the 2011 Agreement. 
V. Conclusion 
When the NBA lockout began in the summer of 2011, most analysts 
predicted that the players would need to make some concessions in order to 
change the league’s outdated economic structure.  Nonetheless, the extent 
of the concessions made by the NBPA in the new 2011 Agreement was 
unexpected.  Two conventional explanations offer helpful insight as to why 
this result occurred.  NBA players did not prepare well financially for an 
extended lockout and thus felt compelled to sacrifice their long-term 
interests for the short-term resolution of collecting a paycheck again.  
Commentators also noted that players became (too) emotional in their 
negotiations, especially in light of the racial overtones that marked the 
historic and current relationship between players and team owners.  Both of 
these explanations offer a good, but only partial, account of why the players 
accepted such a poor deal for themselves.   
This article has argued that a more complete account of the negotiations 
surrounding the 2011 Agreement should include a closer look at the 
structure and operations of the players’ union.  As research in the fields of 
communications and industrial relations has shown, union democracy, 
intra-union communications, and effective public relations have been 
crucial elements of successful negotiations for workers in the past.  By 
contrast, the NBPA suffered from poor, and somewhat exclusionary, 
relationships with its members and launched mostly ineffective (and, at 
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times, downright out-of-touch) corporate campaigns.  Against this 
weakened position of the union, Commissioner Stern was able to take quick 
and effective advantage to gain most, if not all, of the concessions that the 
owners wanted.   
The lessons that emerge from this expanded analytical framework are 
relatively straightforward, especially for players’ unions in light of the 
NBPA’s experience, but also for other private-sector unions.  Unions must 
better prepare their members for an extended labor dispute and channel 
members’ negative emotions toward employers to cultivate a greater sense 
of solidarity.  They must also recognize their relatively unpopular starting 
position and work to craft an effective public relations strategy that will 
generate public support for workers and apply pressure on employers.  At 
the same time, unions must also be mindful of the importance of 
communication and participation among their members to avert problems 
stemming from lack of information and disengagement.  Moreover, 
research indicates that union democracy tends to enhance nonwage 
outcomes, a point that may be useful for addressing the racial dynamics of 
the NBA.   
To be sure, abiding by these lessons may not always bring about 
substantial gains for labor unions and their members.  Much of what drives 
the outcomes of collective bargaining negotiations, in the NBA and 
elsewhere, is the economics of the industry.  On the other hand, as this 
analysis of the 2011 Agreement demonstrates, players and workers can end 
up agreeing to terms that are less favorable than they could be when they 
fail to plan for—and properly execute a strategy regarding—certain 
predictable issues.  Indeed, it appears that such future planning is critical in 
the union’s ability to secure a “fair deal” instead of settling for a 
substandard one. 
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